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NOTES
REVISITING REVLON: THE RUMORS OF ITS DEMISE
HAVE BEEN GREATLY EXAGGERATED
On November 4, 1982, MacAndrews & Forbes, Inc. com-
menced a two-stage, friendly tender offer for the shares of Tech-
nicolor, Inc.' Several large Technicolor shareholders opposed
this offer, refusing to tender in the initial offer and subsequently
dissenting from the second-stage merger and petitioning the
Delaware Court of Chancery for an appraisal proceeding. 2 Not
until fully twelve and one-half years later, after seven reported
opinions, including three trips to the Delaware Supreme Court,
did the shareholders finally lose on all claims.3 The intervening
1. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1160 (Del. 1995) (Techni-
color Il).
2. Id.
3. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A 7129, 1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 19, 1990) (finding, after an appraisal proceeding, that the shareholder-plaintiffs
had obtained a fair price for their shares), remanded by 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993)
(afirming the chancery court's opinion that the transaction met the entire fairness
test, holding that the directors had breached their duty of care, and remanding for a
liability hearing to determine whether the transaction was entirely fair), modified in
part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994), remanded sub nom. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch.), afl'd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, Inc., reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 551, 596 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1991)
(entering judgment for the defendants because, although the defendants had
breached their duty of care, the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they had been
injured), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), modified in part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994), remanded sub
nom. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch.), affld, 663 A.2d
1156 (Del. 1995); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., reprinted in 13 DEL. J. CORP. L.
225 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 1987) (holding that the plaintiff-shareholders must elect be-
tween an appraisal or personal liability action and that both such actions could not
be maintained), appeal accepted sub nom. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 523
A.2d 981 (Del.), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988) (allowing the plaintiff-shareholders to proceed with
both appraisal and personal liability duty-of-care actions).
For the sake of clarity, this Note will refer to Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
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period was an era of unprecedented change not only in corporate
finance but in the law governing the actions of corporate direc-
tors. This Note will examine the current status of that law fol-
lowing the final two Technicolor opinions 4 and two other cases
in which the court revisited the corporate boardroom after a
respite of several years.5 The most famous of these opinions,
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,6 has
been the subject of extensive commentary, often suggesting that
the decision represents a significant departure from prior Dela-
ware takeover case law.7 This Note will argue that each of these
recent cases is consistent with, and a clarification of, existing
law, providing not only insight into how courts will examine fu-
ture litigation but also step-by-step guidance for directors to
follow in their decisionmaking process.
The Technicolor tender offer may have been only an advance
ripple of the then imminent tidal wave of mergers and acquisi-
tions that would "[shake] corporate America to its very core"
during the 1980s.' Rapid financial innovation enabled many
acquisitions that would not previously have been possible.9
Whereas some companies once felt safe because of their size or
542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988), as Technicolor I, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), modified in part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994), as Technicolor II,
and Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995) as Technicolor III.
4. Technicolor III, 663 A.2d 1156; Technicolor II, 634 A.2d 345.
5. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) (examining
Unitrin's defensive measures in response to American General's tender offer); Par-
amount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (grant-
ing an injunction to QVC to prevent the sale of Paramount to Viacom unless Para-
mount conducted further bidding).
6. 637 A.2d 34.
7. See infra note 30.
8. Steven J. Fink, The Rebirth of the Tender Offer? Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 133, 134 n.7 (1995) (citing Michael
Bradley, SEC Neglect and the Extinction of the Hostile Takeover, in MODERNIZING
U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTiVES 293 (Kenneth
Lehn & Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992)). For a fascinating and insightful col-
lection of war stories of an attorney's role in many of the larger takeover battles in
the late 1970s and 1980s, see LAWRENCE LEDERMAN, TOMBSTONES: A LAWYER'S
TALES FROM THE TAKEOVER DECADES (1992).
9. See, e.g., Lawrence Lederman, Current Takeover Techniques, in ANATOMY OF A
TAKEOVER BATLE: FROM INCEPTION TO CLIMAX 41 (Kenneth J. Bialkin et al. eds.,
1986).
1514
19961 REVISITING REVLON 1515
robust stock price, new financing techniques" meant that al-
most any corporation could be considered a "target"" and thus
subject to unwanted acquisition attempts or offers. 2
This realization and the increasing pace and size of takeovers,
both hostile and friendly," placed enormous pressure on corpo-
rate directors charged with a fiduciary duty to maximize share-
holder welfare.'4 The takeover developments forced directors to
deal not only with increasingly complex transactions but also
with the fundamental notion that someone (the raider) believed
that he could run the company better than they could. Initially,
target companies responded to the raiders with disdain; 5 even-
tually this gave way to fear and loathing, such that the mere
presence of a raider in a tender offer became a very real threat
10. Most notable among these techniques were the "high-yield" debt securities
('junk bonds") that provided previously unimaginable amounts of capital to potential
acquirors. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Biggest Deal Ever, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1, 4, 8-9
(noting that Drexel Burnham Lambert played a major role in assisting Kohlberg,
Kravis and Roberts (KKR) in achieving the largest leveraged buyout ever by placing
$5 billion of junk bonds); see also CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL (1989) (pro-
viding a background on Drexel and its mastermind, Michael Milken).
11. This Note will use the term "target" to refer to the corporation for sale or of
which control is sought.
12. See, e.g., Andrew G.T. Moore, H, The 1980s-Did We Save the Stockholders
While the Corporation Burned?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 277, 277 (1992) (noting that
"acquirors and their financial advisors ... plotted new forms of attack that made
virtually any company a takeover candidate"); id. at 279 (noting that, because of the
shift to institutional ownership, laissez-faire policies, and lower interest rates, "vir-
tually no company, no matter how large, was immune as a potential takeover tar-
get"). Justice Moore is a former member of the Delaware Supreme Court and author
of several seminal takeover opinions, including Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), and Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
13. This Note will use the term "hostile" to refer to tender offers (or other trans-
actions) to which the targets directors are opposed or have not consented. This
Note will use "friendly" to refer to transactions having the consent of the target's
directors.
14. See Martin Lipton & Theodore N. Mirvis, Enhanced Scrutiny and Corporate
Performance: The New Frontier for Corporate Directors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 123, 123
(1995) ("The focus was brightly put on directors as overlords of the takeover
fights."). For a discussion of the fiduciary duties owed by directors, see infra notes
44-139 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., LEDERMAN, supra note 8, at 262 (noting that, in the face of a hostile
offer from a now-famous raider, the chairman of the target company exclaimed "[T.]
Boone Pickens is like a barking dog chasing a bus. What's he going to do if he
catches it?").
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to the target corporation. Such threats bolstered boards' deci-
sions to enact defensive measures. 6
As directors became more adept at thwarting takeover at-
tempts (real or imagined), shareholders became more vocal and
litigious in their demands that directors protect shareholder
interests. Many of the mega-million dollar deals described in
lurid detail on the front page of the Wall Street Journal17 re-
sulted in disgruntled shareholders (angry that a deal had been
thwarted or believing that a price was too low) who challenged
directorial conduct in lawsuits that produced some of the most
significant decisions in Delaware corporate law."
The increasing wave of litigation put the courts under pres-
sure as well. Traditionally, the actions of directors were subject
to the judicial deference embodied in the business judgment
rule: directors' actions were presumed valid because a presump-
tion existed that they had met their duties of loyalty and due
care. 9 Suddenly, however, the courts had to question the valid-
ity of these assumptions. In addition to the huge amounts of
money at stake, a hostile transaction put the directors' personal
reputations and, possibly, their livelihood on the line. °
16. Moore, supra note 12, at 279 ("Some of [the raiders] . . . became household
names, and corporate management ran scared."); see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Pe-
troleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985) (acknowledging that the threat posed by
a coercive offer was exacerbated by the fact that it was made by Pickens, "a corpo-
rate raider with a national reputation as a 'greenmailer').
17. For instance, in the last three months of 1988, the Wall Street Journal ran
almost daily articles playing out the details of the now-historic battle for control of
RJR Nabisco. This deal was perhaps the most heavily scrutinized one in history (at
least until the Paramount auction, discussed infra at note 30), from its inception, see
John Helyar et al., RJR Nabisco Chief Considering Buy-Out of Concern for $17.6
Billion, or $75 a Share, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1988, at A3, through the final bid-
ding, see Bryan Burrough, KKR Wins Bidding Contest for RJR Nabisco with Offer of
$25.07 Billion, or $109 a Share, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at A3. The RJR deal,
with its all-star cast of 1980s characters (including Ivan Boesky and Michael
Milken), became the symbol of the decade, inspiring a fascinating behind-the-scenes
book, BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE (1990), which
HBO eventually featured as a made-for-cable television movie.
18. See, e.g., In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., reprinted in 14 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1132 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
19. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (Technicolor II),
modified in part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del.
1988); see also DENNIS J. BLOCK -ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE (4th ed.
1993) (discussing developments in the law concerning the business judgment rule).
20. See, e.g., Alex Devience, Jr., A Hindsight Review of the Business Judgment
1516
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The courts faced many important questions. If a board enact-
ed defensive measures, did it do so to protect the shareholders?
Were defensive measures bargaining chips designed to coerce a
higher price from the raider? Or were the measures simply de-
signed to protect the directors' own self-interests and secure
their positions? Similarly, if the board favored a sale to a "white
knight," was the board getting the best price possible, or was it
selling to someone who simply would retain the current slate of
directors? Recognition of the potential transfers of wealth at
stake," the personal conflicts involved,22 and, indeed, the fun-
damental issues of corporate management and control led courts
to apply an increased level of scrutiny in transactions involving
corporate control.2
As the acquisitions waned, the suits challenging board activity
necessarily tailed off as well. In the early 1990s, many of the
companies that had made takeover headlines in the 1980s stag-
gered under enormous debt, much of it in the form of the previ-
Rule in a Takeover Environment: The State of the Business Judgment Rule After the
Fall, 5 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 113, 114 (1992/1993) ("In corporate takeovers .... direc-
tors are likely to act with ambivalent motives due to the precarious situation in
which they find themselves.... [Tihey know that they may be terminated if an ac-
quisition is successful:"). The situation is even more precarious for "inside" directors
who are also management executives of the target. See Anup Agrawal & Ralph A.
Walkling, Executive Careers and Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids, 49 J.
FIN. 985 (1994) (finding that senior executives of target companies are more likely to
be replaced when a bid succeeds than when it fails and that such executives may be
unlikely to find new positions at a similar level of responsibility).
21. See Moore, supra note 12, at 279 ("[T]he 1980's marked a period of massive
wealth shifting, but little wealth creation."). Contrary to Justice Moore's opinion, oth-
er commentators have argued that "[tihere is strong evidence that successful tender
offers are wealth-creating transactions." Fink, supra note 8, at 134 n.7 (emphasis
added).
22. In a description that might have applied to any number of potential trans-
actions, a district court observed that a contest for control was "[a] complex drama
embrac[ing] personality conflicts, animosity, distrust, and corporate politics, as well
as a display of ingenuity and sophistication by brokers, investment bankers and
corporate counsel." Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 784, 797-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
affd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982).
23. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); infra notes
140-75 and accompanying text. The Delaware Supreme Court noted recently that "in-
tense scrutiny" is appropriate because of "the magnitude of a sale of control transac-
tion and the possibility, in certain cases, that management may not necessarily be
impartial." Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 .2d 34, 44
(Del. 1994).
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ously vaunted junk bond.' Several of these were in the nation-
al spotlight yet again, "[tihis time, however, the headlines read:
layoffs, record losses, defaults [and] bankruptcy."' As Justice
Moore noted, this slowdown gave the Delaware courts time to
reflect on their takeover jurisprudence."
Transactional activity now appears to be on the rise again.'
The advance guard of litigation from this new wave of mergers
and acquisitions is already reaching the Delaware judiciary.'
In Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,29 the
Delaware Supreme Court decided what may be the highest pro-
file transactional lawsuit in history."0 Recognizing the impact
that its decision would have, the court purposely delayed an-
nouncing its ruling until after the stock markets had closed.31
Although much of the popular attention arose from the identity
(and business) of the companies involved, 2 the court's ruling
24. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg et al., Buy-Out Bomb: An Extra $500 Million
Paid for Federated Got Campeau in Trouble, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1990, at Al (not-
ing that Campeau was on the "brink of insolvency," due in large part to $1.15 bil-
lion in junk bond debt, which had been used to finance Campeau's acquisition of
Federated Department Stores following a bidding war with a rival suitor). The prob-
lems of high-yield debt, however, were not faced solely by victorious bidders. Many
companies had "strapped on" such debt in (often successful) efforts to fend off hostile
bidders. See James P. Miller, USG Will Try To Restructure Its Debt As It Misses
Principal, Interest Payments, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1991, at C15.
25. Moore, supra note 12, at 277.
26. Id. at 283.
27. See, e.g., Gregg Steinmetz, Mergers and Acquisitions Ran at Record Pace in
Third Quarter, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1994, at Cl.
28. See, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34
(Del. 1994). QVC has been described as the "most significant [case] since the land-
mark Time-Warner judgment four years ago." Martin Dickson, Barbarians Waiting at
the Gate, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at 25.
29. 637 A.2d 34.
30. Oral arguments were broadcast live nationwide on Court TV and, due to the
large number of people in actual attendance, the Delaware Supreme Court heard
these arguments at a larger courtroom in Wilmington, rather than in its usual ven-
ue in Dover. Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary
Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon
Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593, 1593 (1994). In addition, CNN interrupted its afternoon
prime news to carry Justice Veasey's announcement of the court's ruling live. See
Live Report: Viacom-Paramount Lose Bid To Merge in Delaware (CNN television
broadcast, Dec. 9, 1993) (LEXIS Transcript #259-1), available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Script File [hereinafter CNN Live Report].
31. CNN Live Report, supra note 30.
32. See, e.g., id. ("We're looking at the future of television in America, and indeed,
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and analysis has itself been the subject of commentary suggest-
ing a cataclysmic impact on the nature of directorial duties."3
This Note, however, will argue that QVC and other recent cases
must be read in context and as part of an unbroken chain in the
evolution of the business judgment rule as applied in change-of-
control transactions.
The fallout of the takeover frenzy of the 1980s and the result-
ing swarm of litigation resulted in a three-tier system of judicial
scrutiny of directorial decisions: "the traditional business judg-
ment rule, the Unocal standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, or
the entire fairness analysis."' Much of the relevant litigation
focused on which of these seemingly diverse standards would
attach to the board's action because the level of scrutiny often
was decisive.35 Invoking the proper standard remains central to
the Delaware judiciary's analysis of change-of-control
transactions, and it is further possible to classify the cases into
two categories: (1) injunctive or "transactional justification" 6
suits by bidders seeking to enjoin a target company's defensive
measures or to enjoin the imminent sale of the target company
to a rival bidder37 and (2) suits brought by disgruntled share-
holders following the closing of a change-of-control transaction,
the world.").
33. See, e.g., Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 30, at 1595 (arguing that, as a
result of QVC and Technicolor, "the so-called 'Revlon duty' ... no longer exists
under Delaware law"); Paul L. Regan, The Unimportance of Being Earnest: Para-
mount [v. QVC] Rewrites the Rules for Enhanced Scrutiny in Corporate Takeovers, 46
HAST. L.J. 125, 127-28 (1994) (arguing that QVC represents a "new judicial activism
in Delaware... which unduly emphasizes responsibility to shareholders at the
expense of managerial authority, freedom, and innovation").
34. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371 (Del. 1995).
35. See, e.g., A.C. Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111
(Del. 1986) ("Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment
rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determina-
tion of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determinative of the
outcome of [the] litigation.").
36. "Transactional justification" generally refers to the directors' burdens in an
injunctive, rather than personal liability, proceeding. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 n.10 (Del. 1986); E. Nor-
man Veasey, The New Incarnation of the Business Judgment Rule in Takeover De-
fenses, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 503, 505-06 (1986).
37. See, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34
(Del. 1994).
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seeking to impose personal liability on and thus receive mone-
tary damages from the directors due to a breach of the directors'
fiduciary duties.38 Since 1993, the Delaware Supreme Court has
decided several cases that highlight the similarities and mild
distinctions between the doctrinal analysis of each of these two
litigation postures. 9
This Note will analyze the impact of these recent decisions on
Delaware law, examining what the cases change as well as what
they do not change. The first section will briefly explore the
history and effect of the traditional business judgment rule and
the application of the business judgment rule in postclosing
litigation. The second section will focus on the evolution of the
business judgment rule to the "enhanced scrutiny" standard of
proportionality, as applied to defensive measures taken in re-
sponse to hostile takeover bids under Unocal and its progeny."
This section will discuss the various threats found to justify
defensive tactics and the permissible responses to such threats,
concluding with the court's most recent decision in Unitrin.4"
The third section will examine the so-called "Revlon zone,"42 in
which the directors become reduced to mere "auctioneers
bharged with getting the best price for the stockholders."" This
section will examine when the auction duty is triggered and
what the duty entails. It will argue that such a duty still exists,
at least in the boardroom, if not in theory, and will argue that
the duty is merely a specialized application of directors' general
38. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (Techni-
color I), modified in part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
39. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) (examining
Unitrin's defensive measures in response to American General's tender offer); QVC,
637 A.2d 34 (granting an injunction to QVC to prevent the sale of Paramount to
Viacom unless Paramount conducted further bidding); Technicolor II, 634 A.2d 345
(examining a closed transaction challenged by a shareholder alleging that
Technicolor's board breached its duty of care); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995) (Technicolor III).
40. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
41. 651 A.2d 1361.
42. See, e.g., Ronald J. Rinaldi, Note, Radically Altered States: Entering the
"Revlon Zone", 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 760 (1990).
43. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
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duty to be informed. Finally, the last section will analyze the
overlap and distinctions between the duties of directors in each
situation.
THE HISTORY AND OPERATION OF THE BUSINESS JuDGMENT
RULE
Origins of Judicial Deference to Directors
Under the traditional scheme of corporate organization and
specialization, management of the firm's business is entrusted to
the board of directors." In managing this business, the direc-
tors owe to the corporation twin fiduciary duties-the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty45-which comprise the "bedrock of
the law of corporate governance today."46 In simplest terms, the
duty of care requires directors to exercise the care that a reason-
ably prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances,
and the duty of loyalty prohibits faithlessness and self-deal-
ing.47 Even as they articulated these duties, however, the
courts expressed a great reluctance to second-guess48 directors'
business decisions.49 This deference to the directors has been
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors.").
45. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see also BLOCK ET AL., supra
note 19, at 1; Marcia M. McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care,
the Duty of Loyalty and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 606
(1987). Both commentators trace the origin of these responsibilities to an English
case decided more than 250 years ago, Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 26 Eng. Rep. 642
(1742). The Delaware Supreme Court recently restated this as a "triad" of duties,
encompassing "good faith, loyalty [and] due care." Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (Technicolor II) (emphasis added), modified in part,
636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). Whether this results in any practical change in the duties
owed by directors remains to be seen. See, e.g., Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care,
the Business Judgment Rule and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance
Project, 48 BuS. LAW. 1355 (1993) (arguing that, in fact, the business judgment rule
encompasses good faith and due care exclusively).
46. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 2.
47. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1994).
48. See, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
50 (Del. 1994). Perhaps the most colorful description of this notion is found in Gries
Sports Enters., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959, 979 (1986)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (applying Delaware law and arguing that a business decision
is "not a subject for judicial Monday morning, armchair quarterbacking).
49. Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of
1996] 1521
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embodied in the business judgment rule for at least 160
years.50 The most commonly offered rationale for this deference
is that a court, having the benefit of hindsight, should not sub-
stitute its business judgment for that of the directors.5 A sec-
ond theory that supports this deference is the fear that detailed
scrutiny of corporate management would curtail desirable, entre-
preneurial risk-taking. All business decisions are considered to
have a high level of inherent risk,52 and courts view the rule as
allowing directors to "purchase opportunity with the coin of risk"
without fear of second-guessing." Underlying this theory is the
notion that running any successful business involves making
decisions that turn out, in hindsight, to have been wrong. The
business judgment rule protects directors from liability for such
honest mistakes.54
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591,
603 (1983).
50. See, e.g., BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 4; Franklin A. Gevurtz, The
Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L.
REv. 287 (1994).
51. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); R. Frank-
lin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48 Bus.
LAW. 1337, 1339 (1993); McMurray, supra note 45, at 616. But see Gevurtz, supra
note 50, at 304-27 (arguing that this and several other purported justifications are,
in fact, inaccurate).
52. See MORTIMER FEUER, PERSONAL LIABILTmES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS 37 (2d ed. 1974) ("The very nature of managing business enterprises for
profit requires continuous risk taking.").
53. GEORGE F. WILL, MEN AT WORK-THE CRAFT OF BASEBALL 39 (1990). For a
discussion of the value and importance of encouraging risk-taking, see Joy v. North,
692 F.2d 880, 886 n.6 (2d Cir. 1982) (giving an example of how a "riskier" invest-
ment may actually be worth more than a "safe" one), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983).
54. This result is true even though "honest" mistakes can be every bit as disas-
trous as those made with gross negligence. For a colorful discussion of the effect of
honest mistakes, see Gillette Co. v. RB Partners, 693 F. Supp. 1266, 1288 (D. Mass.
1988). In Gillette, the court obtained insight on the issue of honest mistakes by
watching a baseball game:
When I went home on Friday night .... I turned on the television. The
Red Sox were playing the Royals. They were down by one run. There
was a man on base and [catcher] Rich Gedman was up. He hit a ball to
right field that curved toward the foul pole and went out of the park.
The umpire called the ball "foul."
The umpire, I'm sure, was honest. He was competent. He had to
make an instant decision. It turns out he blew it. The instant replay
showed that the ball hit the foul pole, and it was a home run. It also
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The Traditional, "Plain Vanilla" Business Judgment Rule: A
Presumption of Validity
Transactions that neither involve a sale of control nor impli-
cate self-dealing or other conflicts of interest are examined un-
der the "plain vanilla"" version of the business judgment rule.
In its most prominent form," the business judgment rule "is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company."" The presumed validity attaches to nearly all
showed that the umpire's error cost the Red Sox the game.
Id. at 1288.
55. This phrase is Chancellor Allen's. See Spiegel v. Buntrock, No. CIV. 8936,
1988 WL 124324, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 17, 1988), affd, 571 A.2d 767 (Del. 1990).
56. The most prominent form is, of course, the Delaware form. This Note will
focus solely on the law of Delaware, whose supreme court has been referred to as
"the Mother Court of corporate law." Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d
1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 500 U.S. 90 (1991); see also
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 1931, 1969
(1991) ("[IThe Delaware Supreme Court remains the national supreme court on cor-
porate law.") (emphasis added). As of 1990, more than 40% of the companies listed
on the New York Stock Exchange and more than 50% of the Fortune 500 corpora-
tions were incorporated in Delaware. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 2 (citing 1 R.
FRANKLIN BALOrri & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPoRATIoNs
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS F-1 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995)). Commentators have
argued that this concentration of resources is a direct result of the "race to the
bottom," in which Delaware outpaced other states in its receptiveness to and accom-
modation of corporations. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The 'Race to the Bottom" Re-
visited. Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw.
U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate
Law, in CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOAIC ANALYSIS 216 (Lucian A. Bebchuk ed.,
1990). Irrespective of the historical reasons, it is now clear that, absent a statutory
modification, the overwhelming majority of state and federal courts follow Delaware's
lead, especially in the area of takeovers and mergers. See Elliot J. Weiss, Whose
Rules Should Govern Takeovers: Delaware's, the ALl's or Martin Lipton's?, 33 ARIz.
L. REV. 761, 763 (1991) ("Delaware's approach has become the national approach to
resolving takeover-related controversies.").
57. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1985). This language has been
quoted or cited with approval in nearly all of the major Delaware business judgment
rule cases decided after Aronson. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651
A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 41-42 (Del. 1994); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del.
1993) (Technicolor MI), modified in part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Stroud v. Grace,
606 A.2d 75, 83 (Del. 1992); Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. 1990); Cit-
ron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989); Mills
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disinterested business decisions of directors.58 The plaintiff
challenging a board's business decision has the burden of rebut-
ting this presumption of validity.59 To rebut effectively the pre-
sumption that the board met its duty of care, the plaintiff must
show that the board was grossly negligent.0
Until 1985, much of the litigation challenging board conduct
(and thus requiring application of the business judgment rule)
involved allegations of directors' self-dealing or other breaches of
the duty of loyalty.6 Most suits alleging only breaches of the
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989); Ivanhoe
Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Unocal v. Mesa
Petroleum, Inc., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
872 (Del. 1985). But see Charles Hansen, The Technicolor Case-A Lost Opportunity,
19 DEL. J. CORP. L.-617, 627-28 (1994) (arguing that the Delaware Supreme Court
in Technicolor II ignored "the often used formulation of Aronson"). Given the court's
quotation of, and reliance on, the Aronson language in Technicolor II, it is difficult
to understand precisely what Hansen means. See Technicolor II, 634 A.2d at 360. Cf
William Prickett & Ronald A. Brown, Jr., Cede v. Technicolor: The Supreme Court
Reilluminates Existing Lines of Delaware's Level Playing Field, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L.
593, 594-95 (1994) (arguing that Technicolor II "does not change Delaware law" and
noting that the opinion "has already been misunderstood, even by some knowledge-
able Delaware corporate practitioners").
58. See infra notes 82-139 and accompanying text (discussing judicial scrutiny of
decisions involving conflicts of interest or self-dealing by directors). A well-known
example is an Illinois court's deference, in 1968, to the Chicago Cubs baseball team's
refusal to install lights and thereby play night games at Wrigley Field. Shlensky v.
Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
59. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. For an argument that this presumption adds
little or nothing to the burdens faced by all plaintiffs, see Gevurtz, supra note 50, at
292 ("This 'presumption' entails nothing more than saying that the plaintiff who
challenges a decision of the board has the burden of proving that the directors
breached one of their duties."); accord Balotti & Hanks, supra note 51, at 1345
("The existence of a 'presumption' adds little or nothing to the burden a plaintiff
would have as the party alleging gross negligence."). Whatever its technical implica-
tions, the practical implication of the business judgment rule is that the board's
decision is entitled to great deference. The quibbling over the precise application of
the rule has more to do with the general confusion surrounding the nature of a
"presumption" than it does with the business judgment rule itself. In perhaps the
preeminent article on evidentiary presumptions, Professor Morgan notes the baffling
nature of the topic. See Edmond M. Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. & ST.
B.J. 255, 255 (1937) (noting that writers "approach[] the topic of presumptions with
a sense of hopelessness and [leave] it with a feeling of despair").
60. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
61. See, e.g., Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984); Puma v. Marriott, 283
A.2d 693 (Del. 1971).
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duty of care, in any context, were unsuccessful.62 Today, howev-
er, the business judgment rule has become the focal point in
litigation surrounding high stakes corporate control transac-
tions.' In 1985, in Smith v. Van Gorkom," the Delaware Su-
preme Court "exploded a bomb" in boardrooms across the coun-
try, holding TransUnion's board personally liable for having
violated their duties to the corporation.65 The reaction to the
case was immediate and covered every imaginable viewpoint,66
although the overwhelming weight of the commentary was nega-
tive. In response to this array of commentary and criticism,
Justice Moore, who joined in the Van Gorkom majority opinion,
called the court's decision "one of the most misunderstood cases
in corporate law."6"
The facts of the case are now well known. Jerome Van
Gorkom, the soon-to-be-retiring chairman of TransUnion, con-
cerned about TransUnion's excessive cash reserves "pondered
the idea of a sale" of the company.69 With but the barest of
background information concerning the company's value, Van
Gorkom privately convinced Jay Pritzker, a "social acquain-
tance," to make an offer to purchase TransUnion's stock at a
62. Moore, supra note 12, at 281; see, e.g., Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d 776.
63. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858.
64. Id.
65. Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom
After Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1 (1985).
66. Compare Manning, supra note 65, at 1 ("atrocious") with Krishnan Chittur,
The Corporate Director's Standard of Care: Past, Present and Future, 10 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 505, 543 (1985) ("a long overdue judicial affirmation of the need for better
informed directors") and Barry F. Schwartz & James G. Wiles, Trans Union: Neither
"New" Law nor 'Bad" Law, 10 DEL J. CORP. L. 429, 430 (1985) ("merely represents
a reiteration of existing Delaware law"). See generally BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19,
at 71 n.86 (describing commentary from a variety of authors, including the principal
defendant, Jerome Van Gorkom).
67. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the TransUnion
Case, 40 BuS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985) (calling the case "surely one of the worst deci-
sions in the history of corporate law"); Manning, supra note 65, at 1 ("The corporate
bar generally views the decision [in Van Gorkom] as atrocious.").
68. Moore, supra note 12, at 281. Chiding the critics of the decision, Justice
Moore goes on to note that Van Gorkom "was not the harbinger of director upheaval
many predicted. Indeed, [it] provided valuable guidance to directors at a most oppor-
tune time-just before the takeover winds of the 1980s gained hurricane force." Id.
at 282.
69. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 865-66 (Del. 1985).
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price of fifty-five dollars per share, a substantial premium over
TransUnion's market price.7" Without providing advance notice
of the subject of discussion, Van Gorkom called a meeting of the
board at which he gave a "twenty-minute" oral presentation of
the offer, disclosing neither the basis for the fifty-five dollars per
share price nor the fact that he had suggested the price to
Pritzker.7 Following a two-hour meeting, the board approved
the merger agreement, sight unseen.72
In response to a class action suit on behalf of TransUnion's
shareholders, the Delaware court held that, despite the applica-
tion of the business judgment rule, the board had breached its
duty of care by acting with "gross negligence."73 That this test
for negligence focuses almost exclusively on the board's process,
rather than the substance of its decision, is now well settled.74
The crucial question is thus not what the board decided but,
rather, whether that decision was an informed one.75
In focusing on "procedural due care" (rather than "substantive
due care"), the Delaware courts consistently have reiterated that
they will examine most intensely the information available to,
and actually examined by, the directors.76 "The need for ade-
70. Id. at 866-68.
71. Id. at 868.
72. Id. at 868-69. The court, in perhaps the most memorable fact in its opinion,
also deemed it worth noting that Van Gorkom signed the merger agreement "at a
formal social event that he hosted for the opening of the Chicago Lyric Opera." Id.
at 869.
73. Id. at 893. The decision exposed the directors to personal liability to the ex-
tent that the fair price of TransUnion was found to be above $55 per share. Id. The
certified class of plaintiffs owned 12.7 million shares of stock. Id at 864 n.3. If the
fair price were as low as $60, the directors would be liable for more than $63 mil-
lion. "Never before had such a judgment been visited upon such prominent directors
of a large corporation." Moore, supra note 12, at 281.
74. See Veasey, supra note 36, at 505 (noting that courts "scrutiniz[e] the 'process'
by which the board reached its decision").
75. Although the business judgment rule is said to apply only to informed deci-
sions made in good faith, the Delaware court has indicated that this may often be a
single inquiry: "the crucial element supporting a finding of good faith is knowledge."
Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989); see also A. Gilchrist
Sparks, III et al., New Developments: The Business Judgment Rule in Contests for
Corporate Control Under Delaware Law, C938 ALI-ABA 329, 368 (1994) ("The Court
[in Barkan] held that the knowledge of the market was the key to good faith.").
76. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del.
1989) ("[O]ur due care examination has focused on a board's decision making pro-
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quate information is central to the enlightened evaluation of a
transaction that a board must make."7 When attempting to
obtain the best value for shareholders in a sale of control, "the
directors must be especially diligent."" In particular, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court has "stressed the importance of the board
being adequately informed in negotiating a sale of control."79
The unifying theme throughout nearly all of the court's takeover
decisions is the unwavering demand that the directors possess
adequate information before embarking on a course of action."
The court has been willing to allow boards to use a variety of
techniques and, indeed, recognized that there is "no single blue-
print" to follow.8 '
When the Business Judgment Rule Does Not Apply: The Entire
Fairness Standard
The protections of the business judgment rule do not, howev-
er, attach to those transactions in which the plaintiffs allege
that the directors have breached their duty of loyalty to the
shareholders or the corporation. A breach of the duty of loyal-
cess. We look for evidence as to whether a board has acted in a deliberate and
knowledgeable way in identifying and exploring alternatives."); UIS, Inc. v. Walbro
Corp., reprinted in 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 806, 810 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 1987) ("[The] fail-
ure [by the targets board] to explore to any extent whether a [tender offeror] would
make a higher offer for all shares surely is worthy of further inquiry. A board's
duty is to act with due care and that duty includes the responsibility to reasonably
inform oneself of alternatives.").
77. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1287.
78. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del.
1994).
79. Id.; cf Ira N. Rosner, Paramount Lessons, 68 FLA. B.J. 51 (1994) ("[QVCI has
more to do with Smith v. Van Gorkom than it does with [Revlon] or [Unocal].").
80. See, e.g., Rosner, supra note 79, at 51 ("[Ihe foundation of the law of director
fiduciary duties, even in esoteric takeover situations, is the basis of the business
judgment rule: good faith and informed judgment.") (emphasis added).
81. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 (Del. 1989); see
also Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1287 ("Nevertheless, there is no single method that a
board must employ.").
82. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). A full discussion of the
duty of loyalty is beyond the scope of this Note. A brief background, however, is
necessary in order to fully discuss the impact of the ruling in Technicolor II that a
breach of the duty of care requires application of the entire fairness standard, which
previously had been thought to apply only in the context of a breach of the duty of
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ty most frequently occurs when directors stand on both sides of
a transaction.' In such situations, once the plaintiff has shown
the existence of self-interest, the directors bear the burden of
proving the "entire fairness" of the transaction.' This burden
consists of two "nonbifurcated components ... : fair dealing and
fair price."' Although the Delaware Supreme Court traditional-
ly has applied this standard only in duty of loyalty cases, the
court recently has imposed it on a board that had breached only
its duty of care.88
In 1982, Ron Perelman decided that Technicolor, after suffer-
ing a severe decline in earnings and drop in stock price, was "an
attractive candidate for takeover."87 Through a mutual acquain-
tance, he was introduced to and met several times with a mem-
ber of Technicolor's board, informally discussing the possibility
of an acquisition of Technicolor.' This board member later in-
troduced Perelman to Morton Kamerman, Technicolor's chair-
man.89 Kamerman and Perelman had a series of meetings or
conversations in which they "reached substantial agreement on
all matters.., except price and financing," although they appar-
ently had narrowed the range of possible prices to between
twenty and twenty-five dollars per share." Kamerman then
recruited a team from Goldman Sachs to provide a fairness opin-
ion "based on a price range of $20-$22" per share.9' The team,
however, was allowed to talk to no one at Technicolor other than
Kamerman and two senior officers.92 After reviewing a model
loyalty.
83. See, e.g., id. at 710; Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971).
84. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710; Puma, 283 A.2d 693.
85. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1172 (Del. 1995) (Technicol-
or III).
86. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (Technicolor II),
modified in part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
87. Id. at 352.
88. Id. at 353. Recognizing an opportunity to capitalize upon Perelman's interest,
the director bought an additional 1000 shares of Technicolor stock. The SEC investi-
gated him for insider trading and eventually required him to pay approximately
$14,000 to Technicolor. Id. at 353 n.3.
89. Id. at 354.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 355.
92. Id.
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that showed that a "$23 LBO" was feasible, Kamerman and
Perelman agreed on this price over the phone.93
The Technicolor board's decisionmaking process replicated
almost every one of the mistakes made by TransUnion's board in
Van Gorkom.4 Kamerman called a special meeting on less than
two days advance notice, with no notice as to the purposes of the
meeting. 5 Kamerman made a brief presentation regarding the
proposed transaction, although, unlike Van Gorkom, he had the
Goldman Sachs team present an oral opinion stating that the
twenty-three dollar per share price was fair.9" The board ap-
proved the transaction, and the tender offer was successfully
completed."
The plaintiff-shareholders refused to tender their stock in the
initial tender offer and then dissented from the second-stage
merger in 1983."8 After dissenting, the plaintiffs petitioned in
the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1983 for an appraisal of
their shares.' In January 1986, the plaintiffs filed an addi-
tional personal liability action against the Technicolor direc-
tors.' The Delaware Supreme Court explained that the share-
holders based this decision upon "deposition testimony [that]
caused Cinerama to believe that the directors of Technicolor had
failed to comply with their fiduciary duties in connection with
the sale of the company."'0 ' One cannot help but notice, howev-
er, the coincidental timing of this additional suit-it was filed
approximately one year after the Delaware Supreme Court's
landmark Van Gorkom case0 2 (which settled for approximately
93. Id. at 356. "LBO" is an acronym for "leveraged buyout."
94. See, e.g., Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 30, at 1598 ("The facts [in Tech-
nicolor] were almost a replay of Van Gorkom.").
95. Technicolor II, 634 A.2d at 356; see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 867
(Del. 1985).
96. Technicolor II, 634 A.2d at 356-57; see Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868. In addi-
tion, the court in Technicolor H noted that there was a dispute as to whether
Technicolor's board actually had the "key documents" available for review. Technicol-
or II, 634 A.2d at 357 n.19; see Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868.
97. Technicolor II, 634 A.2d at 357.
98. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1156 (Del. 1995) (Techni-
color III).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1160.
101. Id.
102. Van Gorkom was decided on January 29, 1985. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
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$23.5 million).'0 '
Chancellor Allen assumed that the board had breached its
duty of care but, because there was no showing of injury to the
plaintiffs, dismissed the suit.' °4 Prior to Technicolor II, this
may have been the generally accepted view on this issue of cau-
sation or injury.0 5 The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed in
Technicolor II, however, phrasing the issue in the case as wheth-
er the board's decision was "protected by the business judgment
rule or should be subject to judicial review for its entire fair-
ness."' Accepting the Chancellor's opinion that a breach of
care existed, the court remanded the case, stating "with unchar-
acteristic vehemence"' °7 that, once such a breach is estab-
lished, the board has the burden to prove that there was no in-
jury to the plaintiffs and that the transaction meets the "entire
fairness" standard.
0 8
On remand to evaluate the fairness of the transaction, Chan-
cellor Allen criticized the Delaware Supreme Court for turning
the business judgment rule on its head' 9 and using it to in-
crease the burden on the board."0 Chancellor Allen apparently
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
103. Manning, supra note 65, at 1 (editor's note).
104. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 551, 596
(Del. Ch. June 21, 1991).
105. See, e.g., Dennis J. Block, The Auction Process: Director Duties Revisited, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 21, 1991, at 5 ("Under the conventional (business judgment) approach to a
claim that an arm's-length sale... was at too low a price, [the] plaintiff must
show that director gross negligence is involved and must show as well that the
stockholders were injured by the negligence.").
106. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 358 (Del. 1993) (Technicolor II),
modified in part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
107. Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 30, at 1599.
108. Technicolor II, 634 A.2d at 367.
109. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1137 (Del. Ch. 1994), aftd,
663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995). The chancellor argued:
[Mly [personal liability] opinion was based upon what I had understood
to be a recognized principle of corporation law: that in order to recover a
judgment against a corporate director for a loss caused by negli-
gence . . ., a shareholder bears the burden to show that such negligent
breach of duty by a corporate director was the proximate cause of injury
suffered by the corporation or the shareholders as the case may be.
Id. at 1136.
110. Id. at 1137 (chiding the Delaware Supreme Court for not observing that "this
Delaware version of the meaning and operation of the 'business judgment rule'
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had a strong distaste for such a test, and he easily found that
the board had met its newly imposed burden under both prongs
of the entire fairness test: fair price and fair dealing.' He
found that, despite the flaws in the board's process, the negotia-
tion and approval process constituted fair dealing."' Finally,
he characterized a fair price as "one that a reasonable seller,
under all of the circumstances, would regard as within the range
of fair value; one that such a seller could reasonably accept.""'
Chancellor Allen's opinion set the stage for the final appeal to
the Delaware Supreme Court. The court affirmed the
Chancellor's decision, applying a relatively lenient standard of
review-examining the record only to ensure that the
Chancellor's findings were supported by the record and were the
"product of an orderly and logical deductive process" (in other
words, that they were not "clearly wrong")." To ensure that
this standard of review did not cloud the force of its opin-
ion,.". the court noted no less than seven times that defects
in a board's approval process (even though constituting a
breach of its duty of care) do not create "per se" liability"6 or
present an "insurmountable obstacle for a board of directors to
overcome."
17
makes that rule a liability enhancing rule (i.e., it disadvantages director defendants
when compared to other classes of persons charged with negligently causing injury
to another)") (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 1139-43.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1143. Note that this description bears a remarkable resemblance to the
articulation in QVC that a board's decision must only be "within a range of reason-
ableness." Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45
(Del. 1994).
114. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1169 (Del. 1995) (Techni-
color Il) (citing Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671, 673 (Del. 1972)).
115. The court was perhaps somewhat stung by the above criticism from commen-
tators and the strong reaction from Chancellor Allen.
116. Technicolor III, 663 A.2d at 1162 ("Burden shifting does not create per se
liability on the part of the directors."); id. at 1163 ("[A] given breach of a board's
fiduciary duties . . . is not outcome-determinative, per se."); id. at 1164 (reiterating
that "[b]urden shifting does not create per se liability on the part of the directors")
(quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993) (Technicolor
II), modified in part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994)); id. at 1165 ("[T]he evidence that
defeated the procedural presumption of the business judgment rule does not estab-
lish liability per se.").
117. Id. at 1163; see also id. at 1175 (noting that flaws in the board's process es-
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The court thus strongly reaffirmed its holding in Technicolor
II: rebuttal of the presumptions of the business judgment rule is
not the end of the inquiry."' The court noted that the "entire
fairness standard is not even applied" unless the board has
breached its fiduciary duties-that is, until the court has found
that the board's process was grossly negligent or disloyal.1
9
The court in Technicolor III thus noted that "perfection is not
possible or expected" in determining that the board's process
was entirely fair.2 ' Because perfection is not possible, the en-
tire fairness review is necessarily conducted in something of a
gray area-an area susceptible neither to "bright line precision"
nor to an "unstructured or visceral process."' 2 ' As such, the
proper entire fairness test must be a "'disciplined balancing test,'
taking into account all relevant factors" on both aspects of entire
fairness: fair price and fair dealing. 2'
The similarity of the factors that the court examined in its
review of the fair dealing aspect of the entire fairness test un-
derscores the interplay between the entire fairness test and the
examination of the board's duty of care. The court reviewed the
negotiation. 3 and structure of the transaction and, most
importantly, the board's approval process.'25 Despite the fact
that the "board's now undisputed lack of care.., was a flaw in
tablished that such process was "clearly deficient, [but] did not preclude a finding of
entire fairness").
118. Id. at 1179.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983)).
121. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1378, 1381 (Del. 1993)).
122. Id.
123. The court noted that 'arm's length negotiation provides 'strong evidence that
the transaction meets the test of fairness.'" Id. at 1172 (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d
at 709-10 n.7).
124. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs argument that the structure of the
transaction was unfair because it "inhibited ... alternative bids." Id. at 1173 (inter-
nal quotations omitted). Although the board could not solicit bids (under a no-shop
clause in the merger agreement), it was "free to furnish information and engage in
rather than solicit discussions with another prospective purchaser." Id. at 1173 n.27
(emphasis added). In addition, the court noted that Delaware jurisprudence is quite
familiar with situations in which hostile bidders have entered the fray despite the
presence of substantial "lock-up" arrangements. Id. at 1173-74 (citing Paramount
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 39 (Del. 1994)).
125. Id. at 1173-76.
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its approval process," the court afied the overall fairness of
this process, based on the board's "good faith and the arm's
length negotiations. " " Each of the elements the court dis-
cussed also is inherent in any discussion of a board's breach of
its duties of loyalty and care. Reiterating the major theme of its
decision, the court noted that the "flaw" in the approval process
"did not preclude a finding of entire fairness."'27
After Technicolor III, postclosing personal liability trials pres-
ent directors with primary and fall-back positions for defending
their approval process. First, a board will argue that any flaws
that the plaintiff presents simply do not meet the high burden of
rebutting the presumptions of the business judgment rule. If
this argument is not successful, the board will retreat and assert
that the now established flaws do not render the transaction
unfair. This inquiry may, however, be collapsed into a single
question.' The court distinguished Van Gorkom by noting
that the remand in that case focused only on whether the price
was fair because the flaws in the board's process were so severe
that it "could not withstand an entire fairness analysis."'29 Un-
der this analysis, a finding of (mere) gross negligence only be-
gins the inquiry.30 Such a finding still establishes a breach of
the duty of care but leaves the board an opportunity to prove
that the transaction was fair (despite their negligence). Only the
most egregious conduct or "compound breaches" of the board's
duty therefore remove the need to analyze whether the
transaction was the product of fair dealing-leaving only an
inquiry as to whether the price was fair.'
The court noted that all of the credible evidence also favored
the conclusion that the transaction presented a fair price to the
126. Id. at 1175.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 1165.
129. Id. at 1166.
130. Id.
131. Id. Of course, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized long ago that the fair
price aspect may dominate the analysis. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
703-04 (Del. 1983). To say that the final question will be, as it should, whether the
shareholders received a fair price, irrespective of which fiduciary duty the directors
have breached, seems fair.
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shareholders3 2 .The court accepted the Chancellor's finding
that the Technicolor shareholders received a premium (116%
over the then current market price) that was the highest of, and
was greater than four times more than the average premium
(26.55%) of, sixty-one other transactions that occurred between
1981 and 1984.13 Demonstrating the "non-bifurcated" ap-
proach that courts must use for both elements of the entire fair-
ness test, the court utilized shareholder approval as evidence
that both standards were met.'" After noting that the tender
by the overwhelming majority of shareholders was "substantial
evidence of' fair dealing, the court also observed that the fact
that "major shareholders, including [two directors] who had the
greatest insight into the value of the company, sold their
stock.., at the same price paid to the remaining shareholders
also powerfully implies that the price received was fair."135 Fi-
nally, the court noted that its own recent decisions lent credence
to the directors' argument that the price was fair. 36 Because
no rival bidder emerged with a higher offer, the court reasoned
that the price must have been fair.137 It noted that even lock-
ups or other "apparent obstacles" had not deterred rival bidders
from plunging in. 31 In fact, the court's ruling in QVC that a
board's fiduciary duty cannot be limited by the terms of a lock-
up and that a board may thus have a duty to breach such a
provision and to negotiate with a rival bidder further strength-
ens this rationale. 139
132. Technicolor III, 663 A.2d at 1176.
133. Id. at 1176-77.
134. Id. at 1176.
135. Id. at 1176-77.
136. Id. at 1177.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34
(Del. 1994)).
139. QVC, 637 A.2d at 51. The court held:
The No-Shop Provision could not validly define or limit the fiduciary
duties of the Paramount directors. To the extent that a contract ...
purports to require a board to act or not act in such a fashion as to
limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is invalid and unenforceable.
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EXAMINATION OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES: ENHANCED SCRUTINY
Whereas the business judgment rule historically was raised in
shareholder suits challenging the propriety of a completed trans-
action, the 1980s saw an explosion in suits seeking expedited
injunctive relief either to prevent the consummation of a pend-
ing deal or to strip a target of its defensive measures, thus al-
lowing a tender offer to commence. 40 In these "transactional
justification"'' settings, the Delaware Supreme Court an-
nounced that it would not automatically apply the business
judgment rule but would first apply threshold scrutiny to deter-
mine whether target board decisions deserve protection.
Defensive Measures: Unocal
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 43 the Delaware Su-
preme Court announced that, before the protections of the busi-
ness judgment rule would attach to that decision, it would scru-
tinize the defensive measures taken by a target's directors.'
In 1985, T. Boone Pickens, Jr., made an unsolicited two-tiered
tender offer for Unocal stock.45 The front end consisted of an
offer for thirty-seven percent of the outstanding stock of Unocal
at fifty-four dollars per share.'46 The offer disclosed that, once
Pickens obtained control of Unocal,'47 the remaining stockhold-
ers (those who failed to tender in the initial thirty-seven percent
phase) would see their shares exchanged for debt securities in
the resulting company in the "back-end" phase. 48 Unocal's
board, believing the offer to be coercive and inadequate,
140. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986).
141. See supra note 36.
142. See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d 173.
143. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
144. Id. at 954-58.
145. Id. at 949.
146. Id.
147. Because Mesa already owned slightly more than 13% of Unocal, id., successful
completion of the tender offer would have given Mesa, and Pickens, control of the
corporation.
148. Id. The court characterized these securities as "Junk bonds' worth far less
than $54." Id. at 956.
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launched a defensive "self tender offer" under which Unocal
would redeem all of the outstanding shares, except those held by
Mesa Petroleum, for debt securities valued at seventy-two dol-
lars per share. " 9
Mesa, as a Unocal stockholder, brought suit to enjoin the self-
tender as a- violation of the directors' fiduciary duties to
Unocal."5 ° The Chancery Court, refusing to apply the business
judgment rule in that context, agreed with Mesa. 5' The Dela-
ware Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was wrong to
declare as a matter of law that the business judgment rule did
not apply to defensive measures.'52 In recognition of the "omni-
present specter that a board may be acting in its own interests"
by implementing defensive measures,'53 the court nevertheless
announced a two-prong "threshold" test that corporate boards
must satisfy before the protections and presumptions of the
business judgment rule will attach to their decisions."
In order to be protected by the business judgment rule, the
directors thus had the burden to prove first "that they had rea-
sonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness existed"'55 and second that the defensive ac-
tion taken was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."'56
The first prong of the test, requiring a board to show "good faith
and reasonable investigation,"5 ' was merely a "reformulation
of what previously constituted the entire test ... for assessing
the validity of a defensive stock repurchase."5 ' The second
prong, however, seemed to be entirely new; in addition to exam-
ining the process of arriving at a decision, the courts would
149. Id. at 950-51.
150. Id. at 952-53.
151. Id. at 953.
152. Id. at 958.
153. Id. at 954; see also supra note 20 (discussing the personal risks faced by tar-
get management).
154. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
155. Id. at 955 (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964), which pre-
viously had set the standard for examining the validity of defensive measures and
defined this burden as that of "showing good faith and reasonable investigation").
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Regan, supra note 33, at 150 n.112.
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assess the substance of a board's decision.
In actuality, however, Unocal represented a balanced
and highly significant restatement of business judgment
analysis ...
This shift was far from semantic. While retaining basic
business judgment terminology, Unocal adjusted the focus in
a critical way-. . . empowering courts to review, objectively
and substantively, [directors'] judgments under tests that go
well beyond simple assessment of director good faith and the
absence of grossly negligent conduct.'59
Applying the new test to the case at hand, the court found
that Unocal's board met both prongs of the test and that the
business judgment rule would therefore apply to the board's
decision. 6 ' The court did not, however, actually go through
and apply the business judgment rule to the proposed transac-
tion. The reason for this omission lies in the overwhelming im-
pact of the "level" of judicial scrutiny to be applied. In order to
obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must establish a
reasonable probability of success on the merits.' Because the
level of scrutiny applied by a court is likely to be outcome deter-
minative,'62 that issue alone will decide the plaintiffs likeli-
hood of success. That is, if the defendant meets the Unocal en-
hanced scrutiny burden and the business judgment rule applies,
the plaintiffs likelihood of success, while not nil, is extremely
low. In contrast, if the defendant fails to meet his burden, the
business judgment rule will not apply, and it is then extremely
likely that the plaintiff will prevail under an entire fairness re-
view." This form of analysis, however, makes the whole con-
159. Lipton & Mirvis, supra note 14, at 124 (emphasis added).
160. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
161. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989).
162. See, e.g., id. ([Blecause the effect of the proper invocation of the business
judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the
determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determina-
tive of the outcome of derivative litigation.") (quoting AC Acquisitions v. Anderson
Clayton & Co., 519 A2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)).
163. Note that it is implicit in this discussion that the Delaware courts consistently
have assumed that, if the business judgment rule does not apply (without reference
to whether it fails due to a breach of loyalty or of care), then the entire fairness
standard would apply. See supra notes 82-139 and accompanying text.
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cept of the plaintiffs likelihood of success dependent on the
defendant's ability to meet its burden under Unocal.'
The court expressly found a "two-tiered 'front-loaded'" offer to
be a cognizable threat to the target's shareholders."6 The use
of front-loaded offers has waned as a direct result of the court's
express authorization of defensive tactics in the face of such an
offer. Ironically, however, the defensive tactic that Unocal's
board employed has since been barred by the "All Holders" rule
under the Williams Act, 66 which prohilits selective tender of-
fers by requiring that any such offer be made available to all
holders of the class of security being purchased.'67
Later decisions expanded the range of threats to which a
board might permissibly respond with defensive measures. 6 '
Most prominent among these threats is inadequate price. Propo-
nents of management passivity may argue that shareholders are
quite capable of discerning whether a price is too low and thus
declining to tender their shares. Such reasoning however, ig-
nores the "prisoner's dilemma" that many shareholders face.6 '
164. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1375 (Del. 1995)
("Thus, the plaintiffs likelihood of success ... was initially dependent upon the
inability of the [defendant] Board to discharge the burden placed upon it first by
Unocal.").
165. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985) ("[Sluch
offers are a classic coercive measure designed to stampede shareholders into tender-
ing at the first tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of what they will
receive at the back end . . . ."). In addition, the court found it significant that the
threat came from Pickens, "a corporate raider with a national reputation as a
'greeninailer.'" Id.
166. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
167. Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1995).
168. Commentators have classified the following types of threats:
(i) opportunity loss .... [which is the risk that] a hostile offer might
deprive target shareholders of the opportunity to select a superior alter-
native offered by target management; (ii) structural coercion, or the risk
that disparate treatment of non-tendering shareholders might distort
shareholders' tender decisions; and, finally, (iii) substantive coercion, or
the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced offer.
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defen-
sive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 267
(1989). The Delaware courts have adopted this classification scheme. See, e.g.,
Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1384; Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d
1140, 1153 n.17 (Del. 1990).
169. The "prisoner's dilemma" refers to the situation in which distrust and self-in-
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That is, although each shareholder may be better off by refusing
to tender, an individual shareholder may fear that a majority of
other shareholders will tender.17 If so, the market value of her
stake in a corporation controlled by a single person (the offeror)
would be greatly reduced. Although shareholders realize that, as
a group, they may be best served by refusing to tender, each
shareholder's self-interest will convince her to tender because of
shareholders' likely inability to coordinate their activities.' 7 '
The onset of the "arbs" compounds this problem. 72 When a
tender offer is commenced,' a large portion of the public
shares are bought up by arbitrageurs seeking only a short-term,
almost immediately realizable profit; these "arbs" are likely to
tender as long as the price provides some positive return.74
Under this rationale, if management "reasonably perceives" that
an offer price is inadequate, it should meet the first prong of
Unocal.'75
terest may lead to an inefficient result. In its classic articulation, the prisoner's
dilemma refers to the choice faced by prisoners X and Y, arrested together. Each is
asked to inform on the other in exchange for a reduced sentence or to remain silent
and face the full penalty. Although both prisoners are better off remaining silent
(the problem assumes that, without testimony, neither would be convicted), each
prisoner is likely to be better off, individually, if he chooses to testify. See Robert A.
Prentice & John A. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the 'Nancy Reagan De-
fense": May Target Boards "Just Say No"? Should They Be Allowed To?, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 377, 435 n.289 (1990) (citing A. RAPOPORT & A. CHAMMA, PRISONER'S DI-
LEMMA (1965)).
170. Id. at 435.
171. Id. at 446.
172. See generally EDWARD R. APANOW & HERBERT A. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 173-91 (1973) (discussing the role of professional
arbitrageurs in tender offers).
173. See Fink, supra note 8, at 139 n.24 (noting that "professional traders with
substantial expertise usually buy up most of the target stock before it is tendered to
a bidder"). This phenomenon may even commence on the basis of rumors or other
information prior to the formal announcement. Trevor S. Norwitz, "The Metaphysics
of Time": A Radical Corporate Vision, 46 BUS. LAW. 377, 387 (1991) (suggesting that,
"usually by the time a tender offer for a company is launched, a significant propor-
tion of the stock has been bought up by arbitrageurs") (emphasis added).
174. See ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 172, at 173-74. "[P]rofessional
arbitrageurs often make substantial open-market purchases of the target's shares at
prices somewhere between the market price . .. and the tender price, for the pur-
pose of subsequently tendering such shares at a profit." Id. at 173. The reason that
the "arbs" are able to acquire such shares below the tender price is due to the
market's uncertainty as to whether the offer actually will succeed. Id. at 177.
175. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990)
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Reasonable Responses
The question of whether a target board could, in the words of
Nancy Reagan, "just say no" to an inadequate offer has been the
subject of much debate. The answer appears to be "yes." A board
may simply decline to enter into negotiations with the bidder
provided that the board has "a reasonable basis for concluding
that the offer does not provide the best value reasonably avail-
able for the shareholders."7 ' "A refusal to entertain offers may
comport with a valid exercise of business judgment."17 7 Any
such refusal, however, must be based on adequate information
regarding both the offer and the value of the corporation. In-
deed, the necessity of becoming informed about the offer may
require entering into preliminary negotiations or discussions
with the bidder. 71 In any event, a hostile tender offeror does
not need the board's approval, or even acquiescence, to complete
its offer-it simply buys the shares from all shareholders willing
to sell. Because a large portion of stock is likely to find its way
into the hands of the arbitrage professionals, the offeror likely
will acquire control.
79
Until the mid-1980s, boards had little success at preventing
the completion of tender offers, perhaps because such offers were
rare, and nobody really worried too much about them.8 ' As
(recognizing that "inadequate value," even in the context of an all-cash offer for all
shares, is a "legally cognizable threat").
176. Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 30, at 1622 (noting, however, that a deci-
sion to "just say no" is not favored by Delaware doctrine).
177. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (Del. 1989).
178. See Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the
Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 989, 993 n.21 (1993) ("Although there is no
duty to negotiate with a bidder, some courts have required the equivalent on the
theory that the target company's board is required to investigate the bidder's offer
in fulfillment of its duty of care.") (citation omitted).
179. See Thomas O'Boyle, Changing Tactics in Tender Offers, 25 Bus. LAW. 863,
866 (1970) (estimating that at least 50% of all shares actually received in a tender
offer are tendered by arbitrageurs).
180. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 8, at 134 n.7 (noting that tender offers were "[a]
relatively new phenomenon in the 1960's"). In fact, "[tihe first hostile tender offer by
one New York Stock Exchange listed corporation for another ... generally date[s]
back to only" the mid-1970s. John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corpo-
rate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Gover-
nance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1205 (1984).
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they became more common, however, astute practitioners in
New York and elsewhere, most notably Martin Lipton,"8 ' began
devising ever more devious means of repelling hostile tender
offers.' 2 Despite (or perhaps because of) the ever expanding
arsenal of defensive tactics, Unocal held that the board "does not
have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any
Draconian means available."'' That is, under the second prong
of the Unocal enhanced scrutiny test, a court must determine
whether the board's chosen defensive measures are "reasonable
in relation to the threat posed."' The Delaware Supreme
Court's most recent takeover case, Unitrin, Inc. v. American
General Corp.,5' clarifies the nature of this examination.
Seizing on the above language from Unocal, the court declared
that the first inquiry is whether the defensive measure is
"Draconian. " '8 6 After citing Webster's definition,'87 the court
identified as Draconian those defensive measures that are "coer-
cive"" or "preclusive."'89 The court then went on to incorpo-
181. Lipton is "generally acknowledged as the inventor of the poison pill," perhaps
the most potent defensive weapon in a target board's arsenal. Martin M. Cohen,
"Poison Pills" As a Negotiating Tool: Seeking a Cease-Fire in the Corporate Takeover
Wars, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 459, 460 n.3; see also Robert M. Daines & Jon D.
Hanson, The Corporate Law Paradox: The Case for Restructuring Corporate Law, 102
YALE L.J. 577, 592 n.77 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)) (commenting on the
amount of money Lipton has made since inventing the poison pill).
182. See generally Lederman, supra note 9 (defining and discussing many common
defensive tactics).
183. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
184. Id.
185. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
186. Id. at 1386-88.
187. "DRACONIAN, adj.... barbarously severe; harsh; cruel." Id. at 1383-84 n.34
(citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 780 (2d ed. 1951)).
188. Id. at 1387. Coercive defenses are those that are "aimed at 'cramming down'
on its shareholders a management-sponsored alternative." Id.
189. Id. Preclusive measures are those that prevent a third party from making an
offer for the corporation. See id Here, the court apparently meant "legal" rather
than "practical" preclusion because it cited Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). In Time-Warner, see infra note 214, Paramount had
argued that the sheer size of the combined entities (Time and Warner) would finan-
cially preclude a tender offer; however, the court refused to accept such an argu-
ment, noting instead that such an offer was still feasible. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at
1154-55.
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rate the new QVC "range of reasonableness" standard.' 9 The
court set forth three criteria to evaluate whether such measures
are in this range. Specifically, a court must look at whether:
(1) [ult is a statutorily authorized form of business decision
which a board of directors may routinely make in a non-take-
over context; (2) as a defensive response to. [the tender] Offer
it was limited and corresponded in degree or magnitude to
the degree or magnitude of the threat (i.e., assuming the
threat was relatively "mild," was the response relatively
"mild?"); (3) with [a] Repurchase Program, the [defendant]
Board properly recognized that all shareholders are not alike,
and provided immediate liquidity to those shareholders who
wanted it. 9'
Although the method of analysis is new, it appears merely to
formulate expressly the analysis that courts previously have
undertaken. The first section seems to authorize adoption, in the
hostile context, of those measures that the Delaware General
Corporation Code expressly authorizes.'92 The second prong is
merely a restatement of the traditional proportionality test.9 3
Finally, the third prong appears to articulate more clearly the
court's notion of what is not a coercive program under its "Dra-
conian" standard.'"
Ultimately upholding Unitrin's combination of defensive mea-
sures, the court noted that a court should not inquire as to
whether a defensive measure was, in its judgment, "unneces-
sary" to rebuff the threat.'95 This statement of judicial re-
190. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387-88 ("If a defensive measure is not draconian, how-
ever, because it is not either coercive or preclusive, the Unocal proportionality test
requires the focus of enhanced judicial scrutiny to shift to the 'range of reasonable-
ness.'"); see Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45-
46 (Del. 1994). Perhaps a more logical progression of analysis would first examine
the measures by the "range of reasonableness" standard. As "draconian" measures
(i.e., those that are coercive or preclusive) are not within the range of reasonable-
ness standard by definition, see supra note 183, an initial finding of reasonableness
would eliminate the need for a second-stage analysis.
191. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1389.
192. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991).
193. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
194. See id.
195. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1367.
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straint is remarkably similar to the court's cautionary state-
ments in Technicolor III and QVC. In those cases, the court not-
ed that the proper test is one of reasonableness, not of perfec-
tion. In Technicolor III, the court noted that, although the
board's process was flawed, those flaws did not preclude a find-
ing of entire fairness: "A finding of perfection is not a sine qua
non in an entire fairness analysis."'96 In QVC, the court stated
that the proper inquiry was whether the "directors made a rea-
sonable decision, not a perfect decision."'97 The court thus has
seemed to indicate consistently that, although heightened or
enhanced scrutiny will apply in change-of-control situations, this
scrutiny must allow directors some leeway in their decisions.
THE DUTY To AUCTION: THE "REVLON ZONE"
Less than a year after handing down its Unocal decision, the
Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc.' confronted the issue not of defensive
measures designed to keep a target independent but rather
actions taken to ensure that control passes to a management-
chosen, friendly acquiror instead of to a hostile raider.'99
Revlon addressed the "battle for corporate control of Revlon"
between Forstmann Little & Co. and Ron Perelman's Pantry
Pride."' In lieu of consenting to a hostile tender offer by Pan-
try Pride, Revlon's management attempted to negotiate a sale of
control to Forstmann, thus precipitating an auction of the com-
pany.2"' Even though Pantry Pride had announced that it
would engage in "fractional bidding" and would (slightly) top any
bid by Forstmann,"' Revlon's board entered into a merger
agreement with Forstmann that included (1) a lock-up on two
key divisions of Revlon," 3 (2) a no-shop provision,2 4 and (3) a
196. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995) (Techni-
color III).
197. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del.
1994).
198. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
199. Id. at 176-79.
200. Id. at 175.
201. Id. at 178-79.
202. Id. at 178.
203. The lock-up essentially gave Forstmann an option to acquire Revlon's Vision
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termination fee of twenty-five million dollars.0 5 Pantry Pride
filed suit. 6 and obtained an injunction invalidating Revlon's
agreement with Forstmann. °7
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this decision not be-
cause the agreement resulted in improper defensive measures
under Unocal but because the agreement prevented the board
from maximizing shareholder wealth.0 8 After it became appar-
ent that the sale or break-up of the company was inevitable,
[t]he duty of the board had thus changed from the preserva-
tion of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of
the company's value at a sale for the stockholder's benefit.
This significantly altered the board's responsibilities under
the Unocal standards.... The whole question of defensive
measures became moot. The directors' role changed from
defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of
the company.2"
Many commentators have written about the various circum-
stances that will trigger the Revlon duties 10 or that" cause a
Care and National Health Laboratories divisions in the event that another party
acquired 40% of Revlon's stock. Id. at 178. Such a provision, often called a "crown
jewel," is designed to make the target, if not worthless to the rival bidder, then cer-
tainly worth far less than the bid on the table. See generally BLOCK ET AL., supra
note 19, at 156-71 (discussing asset lock-up options).
204. A "no-shop" provision requires the target to negotiate exclusively with one
bidder, in this case, Forstmann. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. Currently, it appears that
a no-shop provision may be invalid in the face of the target board's fiduciary duties.
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1994).
The best description, therefore, may be that a no-shop provision may do only what
the name implies-prevent the directors from "shopping" the corporation (i.e., solicit-
ing other bids). Such a provision probably would not prevent the target directors
from responding to, providing information to, or even negotiating with other bidders.
205. This required Revlon to place $25 million in escrow to be paid to Forstmann
if another party acquired more than 19.9% of Revlon's stock. Revlon, 506 A.2d at
178. Such a fee may be viewed as the cost of bringing a "white knight" to the table.
See generally BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 140-88. (discussing the sale of corpo-
rate assets to a "white knight").
206. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the named plaintiff in Revlon, was the
controlling stockholder in Pantry Pride. Id. at 175 n.1.
207. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch.
1985), affd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
208. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185.
209. Id. at 182.
210. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25
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board of directors to enter the "Revlon zone""' or "Revlon
land."2"2 The Revlon trigger is the subject of such intense de-
bate because a decision to apply the Revlon standard often is
outcome determinative, and defendant directors thus will strug-
gle mightily to avoid application of this duty. Both the "Revlon
trigger" and the "Revlon zone" itself were greatly refined in
subsequent years.21 '
Development Prior to QVC
What Triggers Revlon
The most significant of the "triggering" cases is Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.214 As a result of a long-
standing strategic plan, Time's board announced its intention to
enter into a merger with Warner Brothers.1 ' Shortly thereaf-
ter, Paramount announced a "fully negotiable" all-cash, all-
shares bid for Time at $175 per share, conditioned, however, on
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37 (1990); Portia Policastro, Note, When Delaware Corporate
Managers Turn Auctioneers: Triggering the Revlon Duty After the Paramount Deci-
sion, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 187 (1991); Theodore N. Mirvis, What Triggers qevlon'?
Some New Answers, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 3, 1990, at 5.
211. See, e.g., Rinaldi, supra note 42.
212. See, e.g., Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 30, at 1593 (referring to "Revlon
land" as a "common phrase of the mergers and acquisitions bar"). The Delaware
Supreme Court, however, is apparently less than enchanted with such terminology.
The court recently chastised a plaintiffs use of the phrase "Revlon duties" in his
brief: "Presumably, plaintiff is referring colloquially but inappropriately to the en-
hanced scrutiny courts apply to certain types of transactions .... ." Arnold v. Society
for Say. Bancorp., Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289 n.40 (Del. 1994). During oral argument
in QVC, Viacom's attorney's use of the phrase "Revlon land" drew a "perceptible gri-
mace from Justice Andrew Moore, author of the Revlon decisions, who admonished
counsel by stating 'the Court doesn't use those kinds of terms."' Cunningham &
Yablon, supra note 30, at 1593 (quoting from a videotape of oral argument, Dec. 9,
1993).
213. See generally Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 30, at 1593 (discussing the
"end of Revlon duties").
214. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). Because the strategic combination between Time
and Warner was at issue and out of a desire to avoid confusion with QVC, this case
has come to be known as "Time-Warner." See, e.g., Cunningham & Yablon, supra
note 30, at 1595 n.14. Because this is the nomenclature used by the Delaware court,
see, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 38
(Del. 1994), this Note will adopt it as well.
215. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1143-44.
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termination of the merger agreement with Warner.216 Finding
this offer inadequate, Time's board decided to "recast" its merger
with Warner into an outright acquisition by Time of Warner via
a two-tiered tender offer, thus avoiding the delays associated
with obtaining shareholder approval of a merger.21 Although
Paramount raised its offer to $200 per share, Time's board re-
fused to break off the deal with Warner, citing the long-term
benefits of the Time-Warner combination and the preservation of
the Time "culture."218
Paramount and several Time shareholders sued on the basis
of both Revlon and Unocal claims.2 9 The Delaware Supreme
Court held that Time's board did not trigger Revlon by its an-
nouncement of Time's intention to purchase and merge with
Warner.2 0 The board therefore had no duty to maximize imme-
diate (short-term) shareholder revenue, at the expense of aban-
doning its long-term strategy.22' The court specifically noted
that Revlon is not triggered "simply because they might be con-
strued as putting a corporation either 'in play' or 'up for
sale.' 222 Legal commentators have interpreted this decision as
implying that a target board cannot "inadvertently" put itself in
play. 22 Furthermore, the threat that shareholders would un-
dervalue the long-term value of the combination, as well as the
preservation of the Time "culture," were sufficient justifications
for the board's move to commence a defensive tender offer for
Warner.
2 4
216. Id. at 1147.
217. Id. at 1148.
218. Id. at 1149.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1151.
221. Id. at 1150-51.
222. Id. at 1151.
223. See, e.g., E. Ashton Johnston, Note, Defenders of the Corporate Bastion in the
Revlon Zone: Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 40 CATH. U. L. REV.
155, 180-81 (1990).
224. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1153.
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What Are the Revlon Duties? Importation of the Proportionality
Standard
"Despite the 'auction' language from the Revlon opinion, the
board is not required to commence an auction."225 Neverthe-
less, Revlon does require that, in the event of an auction, a tar-
get board treat all bidders equally." 6 To obtain a maximum
price, a board ideally would allow round after round of bidding
until one bidder remains standing. Such a prolonged auction,
however, is itself a significant threat to the corporation because
of the uncertainties that it creates regarding ongoing ownership.
As a result, the board must, at some point, declare an end to the
auction. At that point, the bidders obviously cannot truly be
treated equally; in order to end an auction, one bidder (the win-
ner) must be treated preferentially (being allowed to buy the
company) to the detriment of all others.227 Revlon's greatest
lasting impact, therefore, is in governing the conditions under
which a target may permissibly move to declare an end to the
auction and close a sale of the company to one of the bidders.
"In the face of disparate treatment [of bidders], the trial court
must first examine whether the directors properly perceived that
shareholder interests were enhanced. In any event the board's
action must be reasonable in relation to the advantage sought to
be achieved....",2" When examining such disparate treat-
ment, the court must inquire '"hether the board properly per-
ceived that shareholder interests were enhanced by such treat-
ment."229 Further, auction-ending steps must be designed to
result in a "substantial benefit" to the shareholders to meet the
enhanced Revlon scrutiny."
225. Ragazzo, supra note 178, at 1000 (citing Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d
1279, 1286 (Del. 1989)) (footnote omitted).
226. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1986) (holding that "directors cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing
favorites with the contending factions").
227. This assumes a situation in which two or more competing bidders have not
yet reached their maximum bids.
228. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989).
229. Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 659, 676
(Del. Ch. July 31, 1991).
230. Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1284 (emphasis added); see also Ragazzo, supra note
178, at 1000 n.60 ("Revlon and Macmillan taken together stand for the proposition
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The Revlon Duties After QVC: Alive and Well
In Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,"'
the Delaware Supreme Court revisited and refined the Revlon
duties when analyzing the contest for control of Paramount. 2
Paramount and Viacom entered into a merger agreement pursu-
ant to which Viacom would acquire all of Paramount's stock. 3
The Paramount shareholders would receive a combination of
Viacom stock and cash,234 valued at $69.14 per Paramount
share.23 ' The merger agreement contained a "no-shop" provi-
sion,2 36 a termination fee of $100 million (payable if Paramount
accepted or recommended a competing transaction or if the Par-
amount shareholders rejected the merger), and a stock option
giving Viacom the right to acquire 19.9% of Paramount's out-
standing stock if "any of the triggering events for the Termina-
tion Fee occurred. " ' Despite these provisions, QVC proposed
an alternative transaction to Paramount, offering to acquire
Paramount's stock for a combination of QVC stock and cash, val-
ued at eighty dollars per Paramount share." s Frustrated by
what it believed to be a slow response from Paramount, QVC
launched a tender offer for fifty-one percent of the Paramount
stock at eighty dollars (cash) per share."
The bidding war was on, and America watched eagerly from
the sidelines. Viacom and Paramount amended their merger
agreement to match QVC's price of eighty dollars cash for fifty-
one percent of Paramount's stock. ° In a meeting with QVC,
that bidder favoritism that results [merely] in a marginal increase in the bidding
price is unlawful.").
231. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 39.
234. Id.
235. Randall Smith, The Paramount Takeover: Wall Street's Final Analysis: Might
Made Right, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1994, at B1.
236. See supra note 204 (describing the effect of a no-shop provision).
237. QVC, 637 A.2d at 39. These provisions were intended to "discourage a compet-
ing bid" and Viacom's chairman, Sumner Redstone, publicly announced that "only a
'nuclear attack' could break the deal." Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 40.
240. Id. The "back-end" price was to be a combination of Viacom stock, purportedly
valued at $80 per Paramount share. Id. The "defensive" measures (i.e., the no-shop
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Paramount rejected a proposed auction process, citing its agree-
ment with Viacom."M Nonetheless, Viacom unilaterally raised
its tender offer price to eighty-five dollars per share. 2 In re-
sponse, QVC raised its offer to ninety dollars per share, with a
corresponding back-end increase. 3 Despite QVC's higher bid,
the Paramount board voted to accept the Viacom proposal, citing
uncertainties in the QVC offer.'" QVC sought and obtained a
preliminary injunction barring consummation of the Viacom
offer. 5 In a ruling carried live on CNN,' the Delaware Su-
preme Court upheld this injunction, ' setting the stage for yet
more bidding. When the dust finally settled, Viacom won control
of Paramount with a bid of $107 per share for 50.1% of the Par-
amount stock." s
In upholding the injunction, the court found that it should
apply "enhanced scrutiny.""9 In doing so, however, the court
chose not to rely on the traditional Unocal rationale of the "om-
nipresent specter" of director self-interest articulated in most of
its previous transactional justification decisionsY Instead, the
court noted that every "approval of a transaction resulting in a
sale of control" calls for enhanced scrutiny." The court then
stated that the directors have a duty in every change-of-control
transaction "to secure the transaction offering the best value
provision, termination fee, and stock option), however, were left unchanged. Id.
241. Id. at 41.
242. Id. Again, the back-end securities were increased as well. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (Del.
Ch. 1993), affd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
246. See CNN Live Report, supra note 30.
247. QVC, 637 A.2d at 51.
248. Smith, supra note 235, at B1. In addition, the Viacom bid added stability to
the back-end price, containing a "contingent value right" security that would rise if
the Viacom stock fell in value. Id.
249. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45.
250. See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 82 (Del. 1992); Barkan v. Amsted
Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535
A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
954 (Del. 1985).
251. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42.
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reasonably available for the stockholders-and they must exer-
cise their fiduciary duties to further that end." 2 Despite the
enhanced level of scrutiny, the court reiterated that "courts will
not substitute their business judgment for that of the direc-
tors."25 Instead, a court will only "determine if the directors'
decision was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness."2"
QVC appears to have resolved the question of whether a board
may inadvertently subject itself to the Revlon duties. 5 "Since
the Paramount directors had already decided to sell control, they
had an obligation to continue their search for the best value
reasonably available to the stockholders."25 Because the board
has a duty in all sales of control to obtain the best price and
because the best price often can be obtained only by an auction,
any friendly sale of control may now implicate the Revlon duties
when a hostile bidder lurks in the background.
QVC also shed further light on Time-Warner's discussion of
what constitutes a sale of control. Sale of a majority of the stock
of the target corporation is not a transfer of control if the buyer
is, in turn, owned by a fluid aggregation of public sharehold-
ers.2"7 That is, if the buyer is publicly owned without a con-
trolling individual or group of shareholders, the sale does not
constitute a transfer of control. The court's concern was the pro-
tection of minority shareholders' interests and the minority
shareholders' ability to exert their will. 8 This ability is sub-
252. Id. at 44.
253. Id. at 45.
254. Id. This standard already has been incorporated into the review of defensive
tactics. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing Unitrin, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 361 (Del. 1995)).
255. QVC, 637 A.2d at 47 ("The Paramount Board, albeit unintentionally, had 'initi-
ate[d] an active bidding process seeking to sell itself by agreeing to sell control of
the corporation to Viacom in circumstances where another potential acquiror (QVC)
was equally interested in being a bidder.") (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
Note the court's use of the word "bidder" even though it did not contemplate an
auction.
256. Id. at 48-49.
257. See, e.g., Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1290 (Del.
1994) ("[Tlhere is no 'sale or change in control' when "[clontrol of both [companies]
remain[s] in a large, fluid, changeable and changing market."'") (quoting QVC, 637
A.2d at 47) (first alteration added).
258. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 47.
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stantially diminished or eliminated when an individual or cohe-
sive group acquires a controlling interestY The court appar-
ently believed that no real difference distinguishes minority
shareholders in any two public corporations because of the gen-
eral inability to affect substantially the corporate
decisionmaking process.2" The sale of Paramount to Viacom
implicated the Revlon duties because Sumner Redstone's control-
ling interest in Viacom would result in his controlling Para-
mount.2"' "[Tihe proposed transaction would have denied the
stockholders the power to effectuate policies that they believe to
be in their best interests."262
Commentators frequently have argued that the Revlon duties
either already are or are about to become nonexistent.26 3 This
view, however, simply does not match reality, as the Delaware
judiciary consistently has viewed Revlon as an integral (and
consistent) part of Delaware law. As early as 1989, the Delaware
courts noted that Revlon did not represent a significant depar-
ture from their traditional principles.26' The requirement that
a board of directors deal fairly with a competing bidder was
neither revolutionary nor novel and does not seem likely to dis-
appear from the map.26 "Even where there is no specific
259. See id.
260. See Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1290.
261. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 48. For an interesting depiction of Sumner Redstone
and the domination that he asserts over Viacom (and now its subsidiary Para-
mount), see Robert Lenzner & Marla Matzer, Late Bloomer, FORBES, Oct. 17, 1994,
at 40, 40-45 (noting that the "Forbes Four Hundred" ranks Redstone the 16th
wealthiest person in America and describing his ownership of Viacom as follows:
"[T]here is only one boss."); Maria Matzer & Robert Lenzner, Winning Is the Only
Thing, FORBES, Oct. 17, 1994, at 46, 46-48.
262. Thomas A. Gentile, Recent Developments, Refining the Revlon Doctrine's Appli-
cability to Changes of Control, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 895, 905 (1994).
263. See, e.g., Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 30, at 1595 ("[T]he so-called
'Revlon duty' . . . no longer exists ... ."); Ragazzo, supra note 178, at 1035 ("Subse-
quent to Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court has narrowed that case to the great-
est possible extent .... The ever-decreasing scope of Revlon may be some indication
that the Delaware Supreme Court is less than comfortable with ... the enhanced
Revlon duties.").
264. See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 n.2 (Del. 1989) ("Be-
cause the rule in Revlon is derived from fundamental principles of corporate law and
flows directly from precedents such as Unocal, its announcement did not produce a
seismic shift in the law governing changes of corporate control.").
265. See Thomas v. Kempner, No. Civ-4A 4138, 1973 WL 460, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar.
19961 1551
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REViEW [Vol. 37:1513
Revlon duty to conduct an auction, however, a board must en-
sure that it is informed regarding alternatives such as an auc-
tion."266 The court has expressly recognized that an auction is
simply one example of an important information-gathering
technique.2
6 7
Unless a second bidder is present, the Delaware courts seem
quite willing to defer to a board's knowledge and reasonable
investigation. "It must be clear that the board had sufficient
knowledge of relevant markets to form the basis for its belief
that it acted in the best interests of the shareholders."268 As
soon as more than one suitor becomes interested in the target,
however, the court consistently has applied the Revlon standard
and required the board to conduct an auction. 9 Although this
may seem to be a different duty, it is merely a specialized appli-
cation of the general duty to be informed.
22, 1973) (finding that the "fundamental error of business judgment . . . [was the
directors'] insistence in continuing to deal solely with [the friendly offeror] after it
was readily apparent that at least one other group was not only interested in ac-
quiring the [assets] but was willing to top [the friendly offeror's] offer as to cash").
266. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 19, at 266.
267. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286-87.
Revlon does not demand that every change in . .. control .. . be pre-
ceded by a heated bidding contest. Revlon is merely one of an unbroken
line of cases that seek to prevent the conflicts of interest that arise .. .
by demanding that directors act with scrupulous concern for the fairness
to shareholders. . . . When the board is considering a single offer and
has no reliable grounds upon which to judge its adequacy, th[e] concern
for fairness demands a canvass of the market to determine if higher
bids may be elicited. When, however, the directors possess a body of
reliable evidence with which to evaluate the fairness of a transaction,
they may approve that transaction without conducting an active survey
of the market.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 1288.
269. See id. at 1286.
270. The court has cited with approval Chancellor Allen's observation that "the due
care theory and the Revlon theory do not present two separate theories justifying
shareholder recovery.... [B]oth theories reduce to a claim that directors were inad-
equately informed . . . . An auction is a way to get information." Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 369 n.37 (Del. 1993) (Technicolor 11) (quoting Cinera-
ma, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 551, 581 (Del. Ch.
June 21, 1991), affd in part and rev'd sub nom. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), modified in part, 616 A.2d 956 (Del.)) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added), modified in part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
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To speak of an end to the duty to conduct a fair auction is to
ignore the reality of the duty to be informed.2 ' Whenever more
than one bidder is interested in the company, the practical effect
will continue to be that a board will feel compelled to conduct an
auction so as to obtain the "best value reasonably available" for
the shareholders.272 Even Professors Cunningham and Yablon
(the commentators leading the charge to pronounce Revlon dead)
acknowledge that the directors' fiduciary duties articulated un-
der any standard "may still lead management to conduct an
auction in many cases."27 This result remains true simply be-
cause the board's duty is to be informed as to the best value
available and "[an auction is a way to get information." Ac-
cordingly, any variation between a standard that explicitly re-
quires an auction and one that requires a board to be fully in-
formed is merely a distinction without a difference. 5 A duty
to auction is simply a specific application of the duty to be in-
formed.276 Stated differently, the duty to be informed requires
that a board conduct an auction between competing bidders.
Although valuation studies or fairness opinions may be impor-
tant in many situations, a hotly contested auction often leads to
a price wildly beyond expectations-a price that a board cannot
know, absent an auction.2 7 Technicolor III also represents the
271. See Alexander B. Johnson, Note, Is Revlon Only Cosmetic?: Structuring a
Merger in the Mid-1990s, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 2271, 2273 n.21 (1995) (arguing that
the statement of Professors Cunningham and Yablon "may be only ... seman-
tics . . . [because] the fiduciary duties enunciated in Revlon still exist under Dela-
ware law").
272. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del.
1993). For a statistical analysis of the benefits (at least to targets) of an auction,
see Michael Bradley et al., Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their
Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON.
3, 22 (1988) ("Clearly, target shareholders earn greater returns from multiple-bidder
contests than from single-bidder offers.").
273. Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 30, at 1617.
274. Technicolor II, 634 A.2d at 369 n.37 (quoting Technicolor, reprinted in 17 DEL.
J. CORP. L. at 581).
275. Cf Johnson, supra note 271, at 2273 n.21 ("Rather than argue that Revlon
duties are extinct, it is [sic] seems better to understand Revlon duties as requiring a
board to obtain the best value reasonably available for shareholders.").
276. Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 30, at 1604 ("Revlon is simply a particular-
ized application of the duty of care ....").
277. The battles for RJR and Paramount are prime examples of auctions leading to
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Delaware Supreme Court's encouragement to directors to negoti-
ate fully and fairly with rival bidders. In its decision, the court
noted that the absence of a rival bid is evidence that the price
obtained was fair and is thus "supportive of the board's decision
to proceed" with the transaction. 8 If the absence of a compet-
ing bid is evidence that the proposed price is fair, the presence of
a rival party ready to bid must at least be some evidence that a
higher price might be obtained. A theoretical elimination of the
Revlon duty to auction thus simply does not exist in the reality
of the boardroom. Experienced counsel must now advise direc-
tors that the failure to deal fairly with all bidders will (1) result
in an injunction if the bidder challenges the board action prior to
closing or (2) be considered strong evidence that a higher price
may have been available (and that the, transaction just might
not have been entirely fair to the shareholders) if it is chal-
lenged in a personal liability suit brought after closing. Under
this analysis, target directors bear dual pressures from the Dela-
ware courts to explore fully all bids for their corporations. These
pressures demonstrate that, in the boardroom (if not necessarily
in analytical theory), the rumors of Revlon's demise seem to
prices wildly beyond the "fair" price at which the directors were prepared to sell the
company. See supra notes 17, 214-24 and accompanying text. The reason for this
may not be so much economic as emotional. At some point in the auction process,
pride and arrogance are likely to affect the bids and produce a price based as much
on a desire to win as on the actual value of the company. See, e.g., Paul Noglows,
Act Two in Par Spar, VARIETY, Dec. 20, 1993, at 1, 63 (statement of Mario Gabelli)
("With the egos involved [in the Paramount battle], who knows how high (prices]
will go?"); Randall Smith, Biggest Buyout Ever Finishes As Flop for ER and Dozens
of Large Investors, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1995, at A5 (statement of John Coffee)
("'Once you get into auctions, hubris takes over, and parties pay extraordinary
amounts' for acquisitions."). As a result, auctions are still likely to produce prices
well beyond what may be "fair." Consider, for example, the sale of Stokely-Van
Camp, the maker of frozen and canned foods and what came to be the crown jew-
el--Gatorade. A group led by the inside management persuaded the board that a
price of $55 per share was fair. LEDERMAN, supra note 8, at 195. While this group
was finalizing its financing, Pillsbury unexpectedly announced that it would pay $62
per share. Id. at 199. Now that the company was fully "in play," the board had to
conduct an auction. In the end, Quaker Oats won the bidding at $77 per share. Id.
at 201. With 2.7 million shares outstanding, id. at 191, the unanticipated auction
resulted in an additional $60 million payout to the shareholders.
278. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1177 (Del. 1995) (Techni-
color III) (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (1989)).
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have been greatly exaggerated.279
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON: ARE THESE POSTURES INTERNALLY
CONSISTENT? Do THEY NEED To BE?
The Burden Shift Under Technicolor II Is Consistent with Prior
Cases
The Technicolor H decision, applying the entire fairness stan-
dard to the breach of a board's duty of care, already has pro-
voked significant commentary suggesting that entire fairness
review is a radical development in Delaware law. ° A closer
reading, however, suggests that this holding is merely a clari-
fying reiteration of existing, well-established precedent.2"' The
court in Van Gorkom found the defendants liable based solely on
a showing that they had breached their duty of care; the plain-
tiff did not prove causation or harm."2 In Technicolor III, the
Delaware Supreme Court distinguished Van Gorkom on the
basis that the "compound breaches of the duties of care... could
not withstand an entire fairness analysis."2" The plaintiffs had
established the directors' liability, and the only issue left to be
279. This phrase, and indeed the title of this Note, is based on the popular, if not
the correct, version of a quotation from a cable from Mark Twain to the Associated
Press after several newspapers printed a story concerning his reported death: "The
reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." See, e.g., ASHTON APPLEWHITE ET AL.,
AND I QUOTE: THE DEFINITIVE COLLECTION OF QUOTES, SAYINGS, AND JOKES FOR
THE CONTEMPORARY SPEECMAKER 186 (1992). Although that is the more famous
version, the actual quote was probably: "The report of my death was an exagger-
ation." OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 554 (3d ed. 1979). Perhaps the best
comment on the accuracy of popular quotations in general comes from Yogi Berra,
who once complained, "I didn't say everything I said." DANIEL OKRENT & STEVE
WULF, BASEBALL ANECDOTES 207 (1989).
280. E.g., Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 30, at 1596 (describing the application
of entire fairness as a "novel holding"); cf. Prickett & Brown, supra note 57, at 595
(noting that "doomsayers' of the bar in Delaware and elsewhere, as well as legal
academia and the media, have already rolled their eyes to heaven in false alarm").
281. See Prickett & Brown, supra note 57, at 595-96 (arguing that Technicolor
"does not change [Delaware] law").
282. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 889 (Del. 1985) (noting that the question
of whether the $55 price was "inadequate . . .is irrelevant to the threshold question
of whether an informed judgment was reached" or whether the duty of care was
met).
283. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 (Del. 1995) (Technicol-
or II).
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resolved was the amount of that liability."
Based on such a finding, the court remanded the case to the
chancery court for "an evidentiary hearing to determine the fair
value of [plaintiffs'] shares... in accordance with Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc."5' Weinberger, a duty of loyalty case, clearly pro-
vides that the defendants have the burden of proving the fair
price at such a hearing. 6 Furthermore, subsequent decisions
seem to reinforce this requirement, implying that, if the busi-
ness judgment rule does not apply (for either loyalty or care rea-
sons), the entire fairness standard naturally would be the appro-
priate standard of review.28 Indeed, from the shareholders'
economic perspective, it makes no difference whether their loss-
es were caused "by a board's gross negligence or by acts of board
disloyalty."" Consequently, either fault logically should entail
the same consequences-that the directors be required to prove
the fairness of the transaction.289
If the business judgment rule can be described as a judicial
unwillingness to inquire into the reasonableness of a business
decision by a disinterested, informed board,290 it is only ratio-
nal that any decision made by either a self-interested or an unin-
formed board is subject to second-guessing29' to ensure that
the outcome was fair to the shareholders. The application of the
intrinsic fairness standard to both interested and uninformed
boards thus is consistent with prior Delaware case law. If the
284. Id.
285. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
286. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
287. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del.
1988) (noting that a court should not "evaluate the wisdom and merits of a business
decision unless . . . the decision was not the product of an informed, disinterested,
and independent board" and further noting that, "[in such a context, the challenged
transaction must withstand rigorous judicial scrutiny under the exacting standards of
entire fairness") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
288. Regan, supra note 33, at 144 (citing Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corpo-
rate Governance 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 486 (1992)).
289. See id. (discussing the impact of a "decision-making process . .. gone awry"
from either gross negligence or disloyalty).
290. See supra notes 44-139 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("Under the
business judgment rule there is no protection for directors who have made 'an unin-
telligent or unadvised judgment.'") (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass, 167
A. 831, 833 (Del. Ch. 1933)).
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business judgment rule does not apply, irrespective of whether
the plaintiff rebuts the presumption of loyalty or the pre-
sumption of due care, the burden shifts to the defendant board
to prove the entire fairness of the deal.2
Beyond noting that such a shift of burdens to the defendant
directors is consistent with corporate-law precedent, it may be
helpful to analyze whether it makes sense and, further, whether
it is fair. The majority of suits seeking damages arise out of
transactions involving a single prospective buyer."3 The Tech-
nicolor II burden shift in practice, therefore, is likely to be sig-
nificant only to suits challenging transactions involving a single
offeror, even though it is not so limited in theory. 4 A court
will most likely reach the entire fairness stage of the analysis
only in cases in which there was a single bidder. When a jilted
bidder thinks it has been wrongfully spurned by such a decision
of a target board, the bidder will most likely bring an immediate
(pre-closing) suit seeking injunctive relief ordering the target's
board to commence or to reinstate the Revlon auction process or
to void the target's defensive measures.9 If, however, the
292. Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 30, at 1596 ("Technicolor is clear in its
novel holding that violations of the duty of care imply substantially the same conse-
quences as violations of the duty of loyalty."). As discussed above, this holding is not
necessarily as "novel" as it may have appeared. See supra notes 82-139 and accom-
panying text.
293. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (Technicolor I),
modified in part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279
(Del. 1989); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983); Rand v. Western Airlines, reprinted in 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1292 (DOI. Ch.
Feb. 25, 1994); Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, Inc., reprinted in 19 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1127 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1993); In re Vitalink Communications Corp. Share-
holders Litig., reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1311 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1991); Yanow
v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 659 (Del. Ch. July 31,
1991).
294. Some transactions, however, give rise to both types of suits. See, e.g.,
Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989).
295. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986)
(remanding for further consideration a tender offeror's suit to enjoin the target
company's poison pill); Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986)
(granting injunction to hostile tender offeror); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acqui-
sition Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) (granting an injunction sought by a hostile
tender offeror seeking to enjoin exercise of a lock-up option); Black & Decker Corp.
v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988) (granting a preliminary
injunction sought by a hostile bidder); Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651
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board's process has been adequate, 96 it is entitled to the
protections of the business judgment rule and no injunction will
issue." Courts will permit the transaction to close, foreclosing
any subsequent challenge. If a court finds the board's
decisionmaking process defective,298 the court will not protect
the board's decision and will issue an injunction, thereby pre-
venting either the consummation of an unfair transaction or the
improper use of a defensive measure. 9 Thereafter, a court or-
der will cover the board to ensure that it goes through a proper
A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) (reversing and remanding the chancery court's grant of injunc-
tion to a hostile offeror); Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 36 (Del. 1994) ("QVC . . . [was] seeking preliminary and permanent injunc-
tive relief."); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142
(Del. 1989) (denying injunctive relief sought by rejected bidder Paramount); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989) (granting an injunction
to an "[ulnsuccessful bidder at corporate auction [seeking] to preliminarily enjoin
lockup agreement between corporate directors and white knight"); Ivanhoe Partners
v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1346 (Del. 1987) (denying injunctive relief
sought by T. Boone Pickens's rejected acquisition vehicle, Ivanhoe); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (granting an injunc-
tion sought by the "bidder for corporation's stock . . . to enjoin certain defensive ac-
tions taken by the target corporation"); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985) (denying an injunction sought by a bidder to rescind the target's
defensive measures); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
(vacating an injunction obtained by a hostile tender offeror); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc.
Shareholders Litig., reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1132 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989)
(denying a preliminary injunction to enjoin the closing of a tender offer); Grand
Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988) (granting an in-
junction sought by a hostile tender offeror to invalidate the target's poison pill); City
Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (granting an injunction
sought by a hostile tender offeror to invalidate the target's poison pill); AC Acquisi-
tions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986) (granting an
injunction sought by hostile tender offerors). But see Citron v. Fairchild Camera &
Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 54 (Del. 1989) (denying the shareholder-plaintiffs
contention that directors improperly accepted a $66 all-cash, all-shares bid over a
competing two-tiered bid of $70 for 58% of the shares, with an unspecified back-end
price). The failure of the bidder in Citron to challenge the board's decision may have
been a tacit acknowledgment of the inadequacy of its offer, which it later withdrew.
Id. at 63. In any event, its "failure to submit a firm and unconditional offer [as had
been requested by the board], precluded a [heated] bidding contest." Id. at 68.
296. That is to say, the board's decision was the result of an informed and loyal
procedure. See Regan, supra note 33, at 144 (discussing the impact of a "decision
making process . . . gone awry" from either gross negligence or disloyalty).
297. See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958-59.
298. See Regan, supra note 33, at 144.
299. See, e.g., QVC, 637 A.2d at 51.
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process and fairly and informedly completes the sale.
Not coincidentally, the single bidder situations are also the
most likely to give rise to suits challenging the directors'
loyalty."' Further, these sales of control place the greatest
premium on an informed directorate because there is no "mar-
ket check" mechanism. Perhaps because of these similarities
and inherent risks, courts have held that the proper analogy
for breach-of-care cases is other fiduciary duty cases, not tort
cases.3"' Consequently, it seems appropriate to apply a stan-
dard of review analogous to that applied in the duty-of-loyalty
context.
30 2
When deciding how best to allocate the burdens of proof, one
commentator has suggested that courts consider "factors such as
the ease with which the respective parties can gather and pres-
ent evidence [and] the fairness of making one side rather than
the other bear the burden of producing evidence."03 A brief
300. See, e.g., Puma v. Marriott, 363 F. Supp. 750 (D. Del. 1973); Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995) (Technicolor III); Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). In fact, one commentator has argued that even Van
Gorkom is based on a breach of the duty of loyalty rather than of the duty of care.
Carey H. Kirk, The TransUnion Case: Is It Business Judgment Rule As Usual?, 24
AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 481 (1986).
301. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 370 (Del. 1993) (Technicolor
II) ("Barnes, a tort action, does not control a claim for breach of fiduciary duty....
The tort principles of Barnes have no place in a business judgment rule standard of
review analysis."), modified in part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). The latter rejection of
tort principles is rather unusual, considering the court's holding that the business
judgment rule did not apply. The court's rejection and apparent bafflement at the
use of Barnes seems somewhat disingenuous. See Cunningham & Yablon, supra note
30, at 1599 n.41 (noting that Barnes was included in a leading corporations casebook
for many years). In any event, "[r]ather than analogize [corporate control] duty of
care cases to other tort cases, as the Chancery Court did, Justice Horsey [in Techni-
color II] insist[ed] that the appropriate analogy is to other fiduciary duty cases" (i.e.,
the duty of loyalty cases). Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 30, at 1601.
302. Indeed, this approach is closely analogous to that applied by New York courts
in evaluating actions for involuntary dissolution under § 1104-a of the N.Y. Business
Corporation Law. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1104-a (Consol. 1983). In such actions,
when the plaintiff has met its burden of showing "oppression," the court presumes
that he is entitled to a dissolution of the corporation unless the defendant can rebut
such presumption. See, e.g., In re the Judicial Dissolution of Kemp & Beatley, Inc.,
473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (N.Y. 1984) ("Assuming the [plaintiff] has set forth a prima
facie case of oppressive conduct, it should be incumbent upon the [defendants] to
demonstrate to the court the existence of an adequate, alternative remedy [in lieu of
dissolution].").
303. RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO
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analysis of each of these elements indicates that it makes sense
for the defendant directors to bear the burden of proving the
entire fairness upon a showing of gross negligence. In this con-
text, the board should have easier access to the information
necessary to produce the valuation studies needed to show the
entire fairness of the transaction. The board has access and in-
depth knowledge of the corporation. 4 and might therefore
have easier means of producing the relevant information.3 5
Further, because the directors are in control of the transaction,
they have the ability to frustrate a potential plaintiff simply by
following "the overriding rule for the merger wars: take no notes
and avoid leaving a paper trail."30 6
With respect to the fairness of allocating the burden to the
directors, the desired goal of the legal standard should be to
force boards of directors to be adequately informed before accept-
ing or rejecting a transaction resulting in a change of con-
trol.307 After a plaintiff has proved that a board was not ade-
EVIDENCE 795 (2d ed. 1982).
304. This fact is likely to be true even in a duty-of-care case when a court finds
the board insufficiently informed as to the value of the company.
305. In effect, this fact is precisely the reverse of res ipsa loquitur. Assuming that
the circumstances meet the prior conditions for the res ipsa doctrine (exclusive con-
trol by the defendant, no contributory fault by the plaintiff), the theory is that, in
all cases in which a plaintiff is injured, it is more likely than not that the defen-
dant was negligent because such harm does not ordinarily occur if the defendant
had used due care. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 39, at 242-57 (5th ed. 1984) (describing the theory of res ipsa
loquitur). Accordingly, the defendant must rebut the presumption of negligence. Id.
In these cases, the theory posits that, when the board has breached its duty, it is
more likely than not that the plaintiff was injured (because the transaction was not
entirely fair).
306. LEDERMAN, supra note 8, at 179. Lederman goes on to note that, from his
own personal experience, being confronted with documentation from a deal is "wor-
risome" at best. "Seeing the file [documenting the deal and], . .. [looking back over
the decision process, all the second thoughts were obvious." Id. at 185.
307. Additionally, the nature of what is at stake justifies placing the burden of
showing that a board decision is the result of a "dysfunctional process" on the plain-
tiff. Regan, supra note 33, at 144. In the transactional justification setting, the
plaintiff is seeking only an opportunity-an opportunity to accept tenders (if any) or
an opportunity to bid, perchance to win. In the postclosing context, however, the
plaintiff is seeking to impose enormous personal liability on the directors. For in-
stance, Van Gorkom settled for more than $23 million, without any showing that the
price was actually too low. Manning, supra note 65, at 1 (editor's note). To foist
upon the directors a burden of proof to avoid such monumental liability offends
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quately informed, the Technicolor cases require that the board
show that the transaction was fair to the shareholders. The
board can show fairness by doing precisely what it should have
done earlier to meet its duty of care-obtaining "a body of reli-
able evidence with which [to now allow the trier of fact] to eval-
uate the fairness of a transaction.""8 That is, the board can
have an expert conduct a valuation study or fairness opinion"0 9
and conduct a canvass of the market to determine the "going
price" for a similarly situated business.
Accordingly, the Delaware courts will require corporate direc-
tors to complete an orderly information-gathering process in all
change-of-control transactions. If a party (most commonly a
jilted bidder) challenges the directors' actions prior to closing
and the board lacks information, the court will order the board
to gather more information before concluding the transaction. In
other words, the so-called Revlon duties will apply. If a party
challenges the board's actions after closing (usually in a share-
holder suit seeking to impose personal liability on the directors)
and the court finds that the process was flawed, the directors
must, under the Technicolor line of cases, go back and complete
the. information-gathering process-they must prove that the
transaction was entirely fair to the shareholders. The modern
fundamental notions of fair play and justice.
308. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989).
309. However, the accuracy of valuation studies conducted strictly for the purposes
of litigation can be debated. The court in Technicolor III seemingly agreed with
Chancellor Allen that the "methodology and conclusions" of the plaintiff-shareholders'
valuation expert were "troubling" and "too strikingly odd" to be accepted. Cinerama,
Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1177 (Del. 1995) (Technicolor III) (quoting
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1144 (Del. Ch. 1994), affd, 663
A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995)). For an extreme example of what might be termed a battle of
"hired gun" experts, see Taines v. Gene Barry One Hour Photo Process, Inc., 474
N.Y.S.2d 362, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1983), in which the court rejected both parties' purport-
ed valuation studies of a corporation that employed an innovative photo-finishing
method:
I find both experts' reasoning fallacious and their conclusions preposter-
ous, and I give no weight whatsoever to either of their ultimate conclu-
sions as to the value of the business. The petitioner's expert valued the
business, as of August 27, 1981, as $20,700,000. The respondents expert
valued the same business, as of the same day, at $71,000--a difference of
nearly thirty thousand percent!
Id. (emphasis added).
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status of Delaware law thus is entirely consistent: boards must
sooner or later obtain the same information, either (1) during
the course of negotiating, approving, or defending against an
imminent control transaction or (2) to prove the intrinsic fair-
ness of the transaction.
The Burdens of Proof Should Be Allocated Differently in
Different Litigation Postures
One criticism of Technicolor H might be that Delaware law
now allocates different burdens to the parties based solely on
the litigation posture of the case (i.e., the burdens on directors
are higher in a "transactional justification" case than in a
postclosing personal liability case). Traditionally, before an in-
junction will issue, a plaintiff must prove (among other things)
irreparable injury.1' To require a plaintiff seeking an injunc-
tion to prove injury but to remove that burden from a party
seeking to actually impose monetary damages upon a board of
directors seems somewhat anomalous. As discussed above, the
distinction may be more important in theory than in reality. In
suits brought by a frustrated bidder seeking to enjoin the sale of
the target to a rival, if the board is uninformed, it will fail the
first prong of the Unocal enhanced scrutiny test and the court
will order appropriate action. The shareholders should be able to
obtain court-ordered protection from injury because the actions
likely to be ordered (i.e., those necessary to become informed
and/or otherwise obtain the maximum value for shareholders)
will be precisely the same actions that avoid any injury to poten-
tial postclosing plaintiff-shareholders."' In short, for the board
to become informed, it must necessarily conduct the auction or
further investigate the spurned offer.
Under current Delaware law, a plaintiff challenging a board's
actions with respect to a transaction that has already closed
310. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 603 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988).
311. Cases in which shareholders are the parties seeking an injunction to force an
auction are rare, and courts can resolve them by reference to the fact that the
shareholder has an adequate remedy by bringing a suit for damages. See, e.g.,
Norberg v. Young's Mkt. Co., reprinted in 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 359 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 19, 1989) (noting that monetary damages would be available to shareholders if
they proved a breach of the board's duty of care).
1562
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must rebut the presumption that the board was adequately in-
formed. The burden requires the plaintiff to show that the deci-
sion was procedurally flawed-in effect, that the board did not
have "a body of reliable evidence with which to evaluate the
fairness of the transaction."" If a plaintiff fails to rebut this
presumption, a court will not examine the substantive reason-
ableness of the board's decision.
In the transactional justification setting, however, heightened
or enhanced scrutiny will apply, requiring the board to prove
that it was informed and that its actions on that information
were within a "range of reasonableness."1 3 Because language
in QVC suggested that the court mandated enhanced scutiny
due to the fact that the transaction involved a change in con-
trol,314 one commentator has suggested that all control transac-
tions (apparently irrespective of their litigation posture) will be
subject to review under enhanced scrutiny.3 1 Despite that lan-
guage in QVC, it is highly unlikely that the court intended, or
will intend, to expand enhanced scrutiny out of transactional
justification (historically its birthplace and exclusive domain)
into postclosing litigation. First and foremost, the court took
extreme pains both to reconcile prior decisions and to note that
QVC represented no departure from prior precedent. Applying
enhanced scrutiny in a postclosing posture would rend an enor-
mous gulf in existing Delaware law. Technicolor II, decided less
than a year before QVC, applied the traditional Van Gorkom
business judgment rule in the postclosing context and made no
attempt whatsoever even to suggest that enhanced scrutiny
would be appropriate. That the Delaware court would so sudden-
ly make such a severe break with its prior precedents is nearly
inconceivable. Perhaps anticipating such a suggestion, the court
in QVC repeatedly noted that it was deciding only the facts
before it.
316
312. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1287. Of course, a plaintiff also could attack a board's
decision by asserting duty-of-loyalty issues.
313. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del.
1994).
314. Id. at 42.
315. Regan, supra note 33, at i26.
316. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43 n.13 ("We express no opinion on any scenario except the
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Enhanced scrutiny is justified in the pre-closing setting by the
"omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders," thus forcing the board to prove the procedural
and substantive adequacy of its decisionmaking process.1  In
situations in which the transaction has already closed, however,
several events have taken place that may limit this "specter."
First, in order for the transaction to close, a majority of share-
holders must have either approved the transaction (in the case
of a merger) or have tendered their shares to the offeror. 18 Be-
cause of the "prisoner's dilemma,""' however, shareholder ap-
proval or tenders alone may not be enough to justify placing the
burden on the plaintiffs. The more important factor is the very
likely absence of a second bidder. Because of court receptiveness
to auction requirements, 2 ' a bidder who believes a price to be
actual facts before the Court."). The court also limited its holding by noting that its
conclusions apply only "under the facts of this case" and "only [to] the case before
us." Id. at 51.
317. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
318. Under Van Gorkom, however, shareholder approval is not alone sufficient to
avoid liability on the part of the directors. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873
(Del. 1985) (N[A] director may not abdicate [his fiduciary) duty by leaving to the
shareholders alone the decision to approve or disapprove the agreement."). The fact
that such approval is not sufficient to avoid liability does not diminish its usefulness
in shifting the burden to the plaintiff. In fact, this is precisely the procedure that
Weinberger called for in examining the entire fairness of cash-out mergers.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) ("[Wihere corporate action
has been approved by . . . a majority of the minority shareholders, . . . the burden
entirely shifts to the plaintiff to show the transaction was unfair.").
A deeply divided Delaware court recently struggled with the question of exactly
what weight to give shareholder approval of board recommendations, especially with
respect to board actions possibly involving a breach of the duty of loyalty. See Wil-
liams v. Geier, No. 380, 1994, 1996 Del. LEXIS 65 (Del. Sup. Jan. 23, 1996). The
majority in Williams relied, to some extent, on shareholder approval of a recapital-
ization plan to avoid imposing liability on the corporation's directors based on their
recommendation of the plan. See id. at *29-34. The majority opinion explicitly dis-
tinguished "voidable" transactions, such as the one in Van Gorkom, without elabora-
tion and simply "express[ed] no opinion on the question whether a 'duty of loyalty
claim' may or may not be ratified." Id. at *32 n.23. The dissent was far less willing
to rely on a shareholder vote, noting the possibility of shareholder coercion. Id. at
*56 (Hartnett, J., dissenting).
319. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
320. At the very least, the court will impose a duty to "realize for the stockholders
the best value reasonably available," which will in fact force a board to conduct such
REVISITING REVLON
too low has a tremendous incentive to plunge in with a rival
offer.3 2' QVC is an excellent example of a rival bidder's ability
to plunge in and break up even an agreement containing formi-
dable lock-up provisions that one participant bragged would take
a "nuclear attack" to break up."= The knowledge that the
board will give a potential acquiror a fair opportunity to bid on a
company should prevent most "targets" from being stolen at
inadequate prices." In Technicolor III, the court reaffirmed
the importance of both of these factors, citing each as persuasive
evidence that the Technicolor shareholders received a fair price.
The court agreed with Chancellor Allen that the sale by major
inside shareholders (including two directors) "powerfully
implie[d] that the price received was fair."" Despite a delay in
closing the Technicolor tender offer, the court found the absence
of a rival bidder to be even more persuasive evidence that the
price was fair.3"
Chief Justice Veasey, writing several years ago while still in
private practice, suggested that there is, in fact, a distinction
between the business judgment "doctrine" and the business
judgment "rule," arguing that the "doctrine" is used to protect
the validity of the directors' decision (as in a transactional justi-
fication case), whereas the "rule" is used to shield the directors
themselves from personal liability:
In the takeover arena... not only will the process be scruti-
an auction. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
321. See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989) (observing
that, "when it is widely known that some change of control is in the offmg and no
rival bids are forthcoming over an extended period of time, that fact is supportive of
the board's decision to proceed" with the pending transaction). One reason for this is
that the costs of litigation (which may limit the desirability of reliance on a party to
bring a suit in other settings) are infinitesimal in the corporate takeover context in.
comparison to the potential gains involved in an acquisition.
322. QVC, 637 A.2d at 39 (quoting Sumner Redstone, CEO of Viacom); see supra
notes 155-67 and accompanying text.
323. Indeed, the Delaware court in Technicolor III recognized that its QVC ruling
should make it easier for other bidders to intervene, even in the face of "apparent
obstacles" such as lock-ups or no-shop provisions. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
663 A.2d 1156, 1177 (Del. 1995) (Technicolor III).
324. Id. (quoting Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1143 (Del.
1994), afl'd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995)).
325. Id.
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nized, but substantive decisions will be examined for "reason-
ableness". ... Such a jurisprudential approach should have
no rightful place in the application of the defensive business
judgment rule, but in the application of the business judg-
ment doctrine in transactional justification cases ... there is
a new scrutiny emerging."
Chief Justice Veasey's court now seems to be implementing the
very distinction that he previously advocated as a practitioner,
but thus far it has declined to adopt the terminology.327 Per-
haps, at this time, the court may use a return to the distinction
to clarify the differences between a QVC or a Revlon and a
Technicolor.
CONCLUSION
The predictions of cataclysmic change accompanying recent
Delaware Supreme Court decisions are unwarranted. Technicol-
or II did not change Delaware law; it merely applied existing
precepts to a situation not previously faced by the courts (nota-
bly due to the settlement of Van Gorkom prior to the hearing on
damages). QVC also does not represent the seismic shift in focus
that commentators have predicted. Although the court articulat-
ed new rationales for its positions and holdings, the main thrust
of the case is consistent with well-established principles. The
ultimate result of the recent change-of-control cases may well be
that all scrutiny of directors' conduct under the duty of care will
result in an examination of whether those decisions were "with-
in the range of reasonableness."" 8 In fact, the court consistent-
326. E. Norman Veasey, Business Judgment Rule: The New Incarnation, LEGAL
TIMEs, Mar. 10, 1986, at 25, 40 (emphasis added); see also Veasey, supra note 36, at
504-06 (discussing the distinction between transactional justification cases and the
business judgment rule); cf Joseph Hinsey IV, Business Judgment and the American
Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine and the Reality,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 609 (1984) ("analyz[ing] the treatment of the business
judgment rule . ' . by the American Law Institute").
327. In Revlon, decided before Chief Justice Veasey joined the Delaware Supreme
Court, the court expressly declined to adopt such terminology. Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 n.10 (Del. 1986). In its
discussion, however, the court did not rule out the usefulness of such a distinction.
Id.
328. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del.
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ly has indicated that the proper standard for reviewing board
conduct is one of reasonableness. Ultimately upholding Unitnn's
combination of defensive measures, the court noted that there is
to be no inquiry into whether a defensive measure was, in its
judgment, "necessary" to rebuff the threat. 29 This statement of
judicial restraint is similar to the court's cautionary statements
in Technicolor III and QVC. In those cases, the court noted that
the proper test is one of reasonableness not of perfection. In
Technicolor III, the court noted that, although the board's pro-
cess was flawed, those flaws did not preclude a finding of entire
fairness: "[a] finding of perfection is not a sine qua non in an
entire fairness analysis."33 ° In QVC, the court described the
proper inquiry as whether the "directors made a reasonable
decision, not a perfect decision."313 ' The court thus has seemed
to indicate consistently that, although heightened or enhanced
scrutiny will apply in change-of-control situations, courts must
reserve this scrutiny to enable directors some leeway in their
decisions. Tins enhanced but flexible standard thus preserves
the original goals of the business judgment rule while holding
steadfast in the demand that directors be especially diligent in
change-of-control situations, obtaimng the "best value reason-
ably available" for shareholders.3 2 Such a goal has always
been the essence of Revlon and will survive as its enduring
legacy
T Richard Giovannelli
1994); Unitrm, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1385 (Del. 1995).
329. Unitnn, 651 A.2d at 1391.
330. Cinerama, Inc. v. Techmcolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995) (Techni-
color III).
331. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45.
332. Id. at 43.
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